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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bakery & Confectionery Workers
International Union, Local #6

AWARD
Case #1430 0334 77D

and
Acme Markets, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator under
the arbitration agreement dated October 10, 1976 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
Based on the evidence and testimony adduced at the hearing on August 31, 1977
and my study of the record thereafter, I
am satisfied that the Company has met its
burden of establishing just cause for the
discharge of John Enright.
Accordingly
the discharge is sustained.
I choose not to wrote an Opinion because
I conclude that an Opinion would be neither
helpful to the grievant nor needed by the
Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 3, 1977

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Federation of Telephone Workers
of Pennsylvania

AWARD OF ARBITRATORS
Case No. 14 30 0360 75

and
The Bell Telephone Company
of Pennsylvania

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators under
the arbitration agreement dated July 28, 1974 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above parties make the
following AWARD:
The Company's implementation of its
reorganization plan in the manner which
gave rise to those Union grievances which
are the subject of Issues 4, 5 and 6 of
Joint Exhibit #5 violates the Horlacher I
and II arbitration decisions, and thereby
violates the collective bargaining agreement.
Absent mutual agreement of the parties
on some other resolution, the Company at its
option, shall either adopt and implement the
Union's proposed "Appropriate Relief" set
forth on pages 35 through the top of page
41 of the Union's brief, or cease and desist
from implementing the reorganization plan in
the manner which gave rise to the Union's
grievances herein.

November 11, 1977

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

William E. Wallace
Concurring

Daniel R. Carroll
Dissenting

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Federation of Telephone Workers
of Pennsylvania

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #14 30 0360 75

and
The Bell Telephone Company
of Pennsylvania

This proceeding is another in a series of cases growing out]
of a reorganization promulgated by the Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", on January 6, 1974.

In particular, this case is the third one involving
1
issues of the displacement of central office ESS switchmen attach2
ed to the Company's new SCC office which was created in the reorganization .
A hearing was held on February 18, 1976.

The Undersigned

served as Chairman of a Tripartite Board of Arbitration.

Messrs.

William E. Wallace and Daniel R. Carroll served respectively as
the Union and Company designees to said Board.

All concered were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Both sides filed briefs

and the Board met twice in Executive Session.
The Federation of Telephone Workers of Pennsylvania, herein
after referred to as the "Union", complains that as a consequence
of the reorganization certain ESS switchmen now assigned to the

1.

ESS refers to the Electronic Switching Systems. (Tr. 8).

2.

SCC refers to the Switching Control Center at 900 Race Street
in Philadelphia. In previous cases this operation was known
as the MAC or Maintenance Assistance Center. (Tr. 9).
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3

4

Centrex Group and the Growth Group or the SCC have been displacing
5
ESS switchmen who are assigned to central offices both on straight
time and overtime in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties dated July 28, 1974.
The Centrex ESS switchmen are sent from the SCC to a central
office to connect the customer's newly installed centrex system
with the ESS machine at the central office (Tr. 77).

Prior to

the reorganization, this work was done by ESS switchmen assigned
to the appropriate central office. (Tr. 166-168).

The ESS switch

men assigned to the Centrex Group receive no new training (Tr. 85
86), and have the same qualifications as the ESS switchmen assigned to the central offices (Tr. 85-86).

Since the reorganization

it is undisputed that all centrex installation work previously
done by the ESS switchmen assigned to central offices is now done
by members of the Centrex Group (Tr. 94-95, 165-168).

Nor is

there any serious dispute that the ESS switchmen assigned to central offices are capable of performing the installation work on
centrex systems. (Tr. 86-87, 112).
Similarly, ESS switchmen assigned under the reorganization
to the Growth Group are sent from the SCC to various central
offices (Tr. 49) to work on equipment manufactured
Electric (Tr.

by Western

128).

3. The Centrex Group consists of 7-8 ESS switchmen headquartered
at the SCC (Tr. 132). Their function is to install centrex
systems throughout the entire ESS district (Tr. 48) which includes six former districts (Tr. 39) (Company Exhibit 1) .
4. The Growth Group consists of 6-9 ESS switchmen who work with
Western Electric employees in the installation of new equipment. (Tr. 49,135).
5. Central offices are also known as "end" offices or 'local" offices

-3Prior to the reorganization this work was done by the central
office ESS switchmen (Tr. 50, 91).

The central office ESS switch

men can and do perform the same work (Tr. 90-92, 94).

The Growth

Group has not completely displaced the central ESS switchmen (Tr.
94-95, 131-133).

They have, however, performed work which the

central ESS switchmen could be called on to perform (Tr. 133,

150)

In the assignment of personnel from the Growth Group to work in
the central offices no attempt is made to equalize overtime with
ESS switchmen in those central offices (Tr. 150) and Growth Group
people sometimes share work with local personnel (Tr. 131-135)
but often do not (Tr. 90-92).
The evidence of record establishes that the use of ESS
switchmen assigned to the Centrex and Growth Groups, to the exten;
they work in the central offices, has caused displacement of ESS
switchmen on both straight time and overtime in those offices.
This is the gravaman of the dispute which has separated
6
the parties in the so-called MAC cases.
The question of displacement of ESS switchmen in the centra
offices was the main focus of both the first and second cases.
In the first case the Union complained prospectively about the
effect of MAC intervention in central offices.

6. The first case, No. 14 30 0667 71 was decided on February 26,
1973 (JX-3) in an Opinion and Award issued by arbitration pane
Chairman John Perry Horlacher and hereinafter referred to as
Horlacher I.
The Second case, decided August 26, 1974 shall be referred to
as Horlacher II (JX-2A).

-4The Union was unable, at that time, to offer proof of the displacement they foresaw.
was likely to occur.

Instead its witnesses speculated on what

The arbitrators rejected the Union's

"general" complain of displacement.

The ground of the rejection

was the lack of proof of displacement on the record (Horlacher
I, p.8).

It is clear that the arbitrators reserved this matter

for a subsequent proceeding if displacement became a reality and
not merely theoretical (Horlacher I,p.6).

Mr. Horlacher stated:

""'

The thing to be emphasized is that it
is a question of fact as to the existence
of any contract interference by the operation of MAC, not a theoretical or conceptual
matter...."

"
....I am pointing out that the Board of
Arbitrators cannot be blamed if it is not
convinced in the absence of proof in the form
of particular occurrences." (Horlacher I, p.5).
Thus, the Board held that there was no basis in the record
for directing the Company to restrict MAC to intervening in central offices only when requested to do so by those central office
(Horlacher I Award, Issue 1). The Board added a cautionary note
to the award.

It directed:

"
The Company, however, is directed to refrain from that type of intervention whereby
a Switchman attached to MAC is sent to a
central office when the effect would be to
displace a central office Switchman who otherwise would perform the work..." (Id.)
This language became the focal point of the second arbitration which followed the reorganization of January, 1974.

The

Union argued that the reorganization was a per se violation of
its contract rights.

The Company asserted the contrary and sough

-5to reverse the language in the award on Issue I which prospective ly directed the Company to refrain from displacement.
In Horlacher II, Chairman Horlacher sought to explain the
scope and meaning of his finding in the first case on the issue
of intervention and displacement.

He stated that his holding in

the first case was grounded upon an overtime equalization letter
between the parties dated August 3, 1971 and annexed to the contract (JX-1,

Letter Agreements, p.10).

He stated:

"
I think the Company miscontrues my
position in the first decision.... the
overtime equalization letter quite clearly
implies that overtime will be worked by
the employees in the particular location
where the overtime occurs.... if a MAC
switchman did the job, the end office
switchmen wouldn't get the overtime assignment.
This is the nub of the matter."
The Chairman held that if the Board eliminated that provision of the prior award, the Company could assign MAC people to
do overtime work in central offices and render the equalization
letter meaningless. (Id.)
Unlike the first case, the second decision involved specifi
situations of MAC interference in central offices.

As a result

the Board had before it a specific factual context within which
to decide the question of displacement.
The Union contended that the Company was sending MAC switch
men into two central offices to do certain card over writes which
would have been done by the local switchmen.

The Board found

this practice in violation of its award in the first case.
(Horlacher II, p.6).
The Chairman, in commenting on the Company's position, said
"
This concept could be applied to every
instance where a MAC switchman was sent to
a local office to perform certain work....

-6Such an application of this concept would
make a nullity of the Award provision here
being interpreted." (Id.)

x x x x
"
Who did the (work) on ESS
before MAC existed? Who would
day if MAC were non-existent?
is that someone in the central
do the overtime." (Id.)

machines
do it toThe answer
office would

The Award in the first case was held to bar the practice
of sending switchmen in from MAC to do the work previously done
by central office switchmen, which work they were qualified to
do. (Id.)
Or, in other words, unless the Company could prove that
the central office switchmen lacked the skill and training to do
the job, they could not be displaced. (Horlacher II p.7).
The central portions of the holding in the second case then
is that the reorganization effected January 6, 1974 was not a
per se violation of the contract (Horlacher II p.23), but the
Company could not engage in displacement practices pursuant to
the reorganization which violated contract rights.
Recognizing that problems would likely arise from its
approval of the reorganization, but its disapproval of certain
assignment practices thereunder, the Board provided in Paragraph
II of the Award in the second case, that the parties negotiate
ground rules or contract adaptations made necessary by the reorganization.

Failing a successful negotiation, the issues were

to be arbitrated (JX-2A p.2).
The present case arises from the partial failure of those
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negotiations; specifically those disputes which are the subject
of issues 4, 5 and 6 of Joint Exhibit 5 in this record.
As I see it the Company, seeks essentially to relitigate
the question clearly decided by the two prior Awards, namely
displacement.

It takes the position that the Award should be

limited to situations involving work other than by the Centrex
or Growth Groups in the central offices.

It contends that its

general right to reorganizing would be nullified or at least
seriously restricted if the ESS switchmen at SCC cannot perform
their functions at the central offices.

Whatever the merits of

this argument may be, it is in fact, the same argument made in
the second case and decided adversely to the Company by that
Board.
We need not remind these sophisticated parties that
arbitration awards unless vacated or otherwise modified by
appropriate court action or mutually disregarded or changed by
the parties thereto, are not only final and binding, but stand
as authoritative interpretations of the contract provisions
involved.

Hence it is immaterial whether we agree or disagree

with the two Horlacher decisions on the merits or on their
interpretation of the contract.

Similarly it is not for us to

determine or even consider whether Arbitrator Horlacher and his
Boards exceeded its authority by remanding to the parties certain
issues for further negotiations and by directing subsequent
arbitration if those direct negotiations failed.

Indeed, instead

of testing the validity of those portions of his Award, the

-8partied did negotiate on the disputes which Horlacher remanded to
them, and apparently reached agreement on some.

That act of

compliance, together with the effect of Article 13 and Exhibit B
of the contract, and, as previously stated, the absence of any
court action to test the validity of those Awards, renders them
binding on the parties and not subject to de novo review, reversal
or modification by this instant Board.

As such they stand as

interpretative of the contract regarding the reorganization with
which they dealt and which again is the subject matter of the instant case.
The three disputes before this Board which are numbered 4,
5 and 6 in join Exhibit #5 in the record.
4.
5.
6.

They are captioned:

District oriented Centrex group
End office assignment of Western Electric
group
Overtime for Western Electric group.

As I see it the issue before this Board, is whether the
Company's implementation of its reorganization giving rise to
grievances which are the subject matter of the foregoing issues
4, 5 and 6, violated the Horlacher decisions and per force the
collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by those decisions.
Based on my reading and interpretation of the Horlacher
decisions, I conclude that the Company's actions in this regard
were examined substantively if not in every particular and
considered by Horlacher and found to be violative of the contractual rights of end office switchmen. In short, to quote Horlacher II
the instant proceeding appears to be another "bite of the apple"
by the Company in its attempt to reverse Horlacher I and II.

-9 I find that the Company's implementation of its reorganization plan, with regard to what the Union is grieving over in
issues 4, 5 and 6 of Joint Exhibit #5, displaces ESS Switchmen
in the central offices and adversely changes their seniority
status and contract rights based on seniority within the meaning
and proscription of the Horlacher decisions.

Consequently those

implementations constitute contract violations.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

DATED: November 11, 1977

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

*************************************
In the Matter of the "Last and Best *
Offer" Arbitration Between:
*
*
LOCAL 937, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION*
OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO
*
- and *
CITY OF CHELSEA
*
*

AWARD
Case Number PF-36-1977

1139-1008-77
*
*************************************

This proceeding is a "last and best offer" arbitration over contract
issues in dispute between the above named parties, pursuant to the applicable statute of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In accordance with prescribed procedures, the undersigned Panel of
Arbitration, consisting of Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman and Messrs. E. David
Wanger and Paul V. Mulkern, Jr., the Union and City designees respectively,
was duly appointed.
Hearings were duly scheduled and conducted in the City of Chelsea on
August 16, September 23, October 17, October 24, November 9 and November 18,
1977, at which time representatives of the above named Union and City appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record of the

hearings was taken.
With the express agreement and participation of authorized representatives of the parties, the Chairman of the Arbitration Panel undertook a
mediation effort on November 19 and 20, 1977 in an attempt to effectuate a
voluntary resolution of the issues in dispute.

This effort failed to pro-

duce a settlement.
Thereafter, on the morning of November 21, 1977, the parties submitted
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to the Panel, and delivered to each other, written statements of their
respective "last and best offers" on each of the issues in dispute.
Subsequently, both sides submitted to the Panel and exchanged between themselves, written briefs.
The Arbitration Panel met in executive session in Boston, Massachusetts on December 28 and 29, 1977.

At the request of the Chairman,

conveyed to the parties by their respective designees on the Panel, both
sides submitted revised "last and best offers" on December 29, 1977 as
substitutes for the offers previously submitted on November 21.

It was

expressly stipulated that the submission of revised "last and best offers"
on December 29 created no legal obstacles to the validity of this proceeding; that neither party would challenge the legality or validity of this
proceeding or the Award rendered on the ground that revised "last and best
offers" were submitted; and that said revised "last and best offers" constituted the "last and best offers" of the parties within the meaning of
the applicable statute.
Following the submission of the revised "last and best offers", the
hearings were declared concluded.
Throughout the proceedings the parties disagreed over which statute
applied to this case.

The Union contends that the applicable statute is

the Public Employee Bargaining Law, Chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973, Effective July 1, 1974.

(Joint Exhibit #1 in the record.)

The City asserts

that the applicable statute is An Act Further Regulating Collective Bargaining Impasses Involving Firefighters and Police Officers, 1977.

(Joint

Exhibit #2 in the record.)
It is the ruling of a majority of the Panel that the statute applicable
to this case is the Public Employee Bargaining Law, Chapter 1078 of the Acts
of 1973, Effective July 1, 1974.
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Perforce, with that ruling, a majority of the Panel finds that the
Rules and Regulations of the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, effective July 1, 1974 are also applicable
to this case.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 2.10 Paragraph (C) of said

Rules and Regulations, and in accordance with his discretionary authority
set forth therein, the Chairman of the Panel chooses not to write an
Opinion supporting the Award.
The disagreement of the parties over the applicable statute not withstanding, a majority of the Panel concludes that its "last and best offer"
selection and Award is supported by analysis and application of either statute (Chapter 1078, Section 4, Acts of 1973 or Chapter 347, Acts of 1977).
Based on full consideration of the entire record before us, including
the factors set forth in Section 4 of the Public Employee Bargaining Law,
Chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973, Effective July 1, 1974, and substantively
the same factors set forth in Section 4 of the 1977 Act Further Regulating
Collective Bargaining Impasses Involving Firefighters and Police Officers,
the undersigned Panel of Arbitration makes the following AWARD:
The Panel selects the written statement of "last of
best offer" of the Union as the final and binding
Award on the issues in dispute between the Union
and the City and submitted to this Panel.
The Union's written statement of its "last and
best offer" (consisting of seven pages) is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit
A and shall constitute the Award of the Panel.

DATED
DECEMBER 29, 1977

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
CHAIRMAN

DATED
DECEMBER 29, 1977

E. DAVID WANGER
Concurring

DATED
DECEMBER 29, 1977

PAUL V. MULKERN, JR.
Dissenting

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 420, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers
and
Connecticut Light and Power Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of John Ryan, Jr.
for just cause? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Meriden, Connectict on January 24,
1977 at which time Mr. Ryan, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The essential facts are not in dispute.

The grievant's

job was to inspect the work performed by a private contractor
for the Company.

He accepted money in the amount of $350 to

$450 from the private contractor whose work he was inspecting.
Manifestly this is a serious offense.

It potentially

compromises the grievant's inspectional and supervisory authority
and effectiveness.

It is clearly improper and does not require

the promulgation of a Company rule prohibiting it.

It is a

dischargeable offense unless there are special and mitigating
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factors which would warrant a reduction of the penalty to a
lengthy suspension.
Based on the record before me I conclude that such
mitigating factors exist.
misconduct.

The grievant does not deny the

He admits it was wrong and he is contrite.

He

explains that he was under severe emotional and financial strain
and accepted the money to meet those particular needs.

It is

undisputed that he in no way compromised the job or standards
required of the private contractor.

All the requisite

specifications were met, and the contractor was given no
consideration or other preferential treatment in exchange for the
money.

In that respect therefore, the Company was not damaged

by the grievant's wrong doing.

Additionally, in matters of

discharge for an offense which may very well preclude future
employability elsewhere, the employee's work record and longevity
are relevant considerations.

Here, the grievant served the

Company satisfactorily for twenty-four years.
service entitles him to some consideration.

That period of
He is at an age

where employment elsewhere would be difficult under ordinary
circumstances, and highly improbable if he is discharged for
this offense.
Let me analogize to misconduct proceedings of grievance
committees of Bar Associations.

If a lawyer were to commit an

offense of comparable seriousness, the matter of whether he

-3would be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law usually
turns on his prior record as an attorney.

If the offense occurs

early in his career disbarment usually follows.

But if he has

served satisfactorily for an extended number of years, and if
as here, the offense has not done actual harm, chances are that
he would be suspended from the practice of law for an extended
period of time, but allowed to resume his practice thereafter.
I choose to apply that analogy to this case.

The grievant

has devoted almost his entire working life to the Company, and
until this incident has done his work satisfactorily.

On that

basis I accept his statement that only extreme pressures caused
him to accept the money.

Because the job was not compromised, and

because the Company in this particular case was not damaged, I
think that a lengthy suspension more nearly approximates a
"just cause" penalty than dismissal.
Accordingly it shall be my Award that the grievant's
discharge be reduced to a suspension for the full period of
time since his original suspension plus an additional three
months.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of John Ryan, Jr. is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. Three months
following the date of this Award he shall
be reinstated without back pay.

Eric/J . Schmertz\r

-4DATED: /April 28, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this -28th
day of April, 1977 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees,
Local 338 IBT

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Dellwood Foods, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the suspension
of Thomas Carmichael? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Union offices in Mt. Vernon,
New York on July 7, 1977 at which time Mr. Carmichael, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The Company charges the grievant with a violation of
Section 13 E of the collective bargaining agreement.

That

Section accords the Company the right to discharge an employee
for:

"Direct refusal to obey orders given
by the proper party unless such orders
jeopardize life or health."
The Company argues that with the power to dismiss it

may, per force, impose the lesser penalty of suspension.
The Company's case is faulty because there is no evidence
that the grievant refused to obey a direct order.

Based on the

evidence and testimony it is clear that, in objecting to his
foreman performing what he considered to be bargaining unit work,

-2the grievant was disrespectful and argumentative.

Also, by

stating that if the foreman continued to perform the work, he,
the grievant, "would not have to work", the grievant substituted
a threat of impermissible self-help for the prescribed use of
the grievance provisions of the contract.

But the grievant was

not disciplined for being disrespectful or argumentative or for
failing to complain about what he thought was a contract breach
in the proper manner.

Rather, the charge against him is a

"direct refusal to obey orders
the charge.

" The facts do not support

He was given no orders which he refused to obey.

He did not cease performing his duties.

He continued working

at his regular assigned duties while he argued with the foreman
over the work which the foreman was performing.

Contrary to

the Company's statements, he was not "ordered to return to his
job" nor did he refuse to work in defiance of any such order.
The Company argues that it should not be required to
wait until the grievant carried out his threat "not to work",
but rather should be permitted to treat his "threat" as equivalent to a refusal to work.

I cannot agree.

Whether the griev-

ant would have stopped work if his foreman continued performing
the disputed activity is speculative.

Discipline cannot rest on

speculation especially where it is expressly based on an allegation of a "direct refusal to obey orders."

In short, to sustain

-3the suspension based on the offense charged, the elements of
that offense must have taken place.

The bare possibility or

even probability that the grievant would have refused to continue
at work is not synonymous with an order given and an order
disobeyed.
Accordingly, as the allegation against the grievant is
not supported by the facts, the discipline explicitly based on
that allegation must be reversed.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The
the
not
Mr.
the

suspension of Thomas Carmichael for
reasons asserted by the Company was
for just cause. It is reversed, and
Carmichael shall be made whole for
time lost.

The Arbitrator's fee and expenses for the
scheduled hearing date of April 18, 1977
when Mr. Carmichael failed to appear, shall
be borne by the Union. The balance of the
Arbitrator's fee and expenses shall be shared
equally by the parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 29, 1977
STATE OF: New York ) s s > :
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this twenty ninth day of July, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Is the Employer in violation of the
Agreement by operating the Photomec
16mm color reversal process with a
crew of less than three? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A "quickie" arbitration hearing was held on August 15,
1975 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
On July 14, 1966, when the NOTE at the end of the
reference to Negative Developing Department in Schedule A of
the contract read as it presently reads, the then Industry
Arbitrator Joseph E. McMahon held (Case 702-66 Al) that development of color reversal film stock, then done on the Pako machine,
was not "color negative developing" within the meaning of the
NOTE.
In pertinent part he stated:
"The type of work performed by the Pako
machine is the crux of this dispute.
The machine processes color reversal film
stock.
"
the Pako machine does not fall
squarely within either the Positive or
Negative Developing Department."

-2-

"The note in Schedule A relating to
color negative developing, fixes the
crew complement. That provision is
not binding here, in view of my previous determination that the Pako machine
does not come within the Negative Developing Department." (Underscoring supplied.)
He ruled therefore that a crew of three operators on
the Pako machine was not required by the contract, and that
the Employer could operate that machine and run the color
reversal development process with a crew of two.
Whether Mr. McMahon was correct is immaterial.

His

Award is binding unless the parties by mutual agreement reject
or change it, or unless by contract negotiations or other agreement its effect is amended, changed or nullified.
None of this was done.

Following the McMahon Award,

no change, expansion or modification in the NOTE was made,
nor was there any other contract provision or agreement entered
into covering color reversal development.
So, the McMahon decision remains as the "definitive
word" on color reversal development performed onthe Pako
machine.
The issue before me involves color reversal development
on the Photomec machine.

Though the Photomec is different

from the Pako, the process or "type of work" (which Mr. McMahon
said was the "crux" of the earlier case) is still color reversal
development.

I fail to see how, in the face of the McMahon

ruling on the nature of the process of color

reversal develop-

-3ing, and in the

absence of any subsequent contract provision

or any other agreement to deal with that process, I can now
hold that color reversal development on the Photomec machine
is color negative developing within the meaning of the NOTE.
As I see it, the question still remains a matter for bargaining between the parties and not for arbitration.
Nor can I presently consider the question of the manning
of the Photomec machine on operational grounds.

As yet that

machine has not run enough to determine its complexities,
difficulties, and its demands on its operators.

It ran for a

short period in 1970, which obviously cannot be used as a
contemporary

experience, and then again for only a few days

this month.

The number and frequency of breaks, if any, the

physical, mental and other operating demands on the operators
assigned cannot yet be determined, and must await the passage
of a reasonable running time.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties makes the following AWARD:
The NOTE referred to in the contract
at the end of the reference to the
Negative Developing Department in
Schedule A does not apply to color
reversal developing performed by the
Photomec machine. That process is
not "Color Negative Developing" within
the meaning of the NOTE. Therefore the
Employer is not in violation of the Agreement
by operating the Photomec 16mm color reversal
process with a crew of less than three. It
may operate the machine with a crew of two.
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The Arbitrator's fee shall be borned
by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On the seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowled to me
that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S,E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has breached the
contract by excluding a new employee
hired to perform plant clerical functions
in the Maintenance Department from the
bargaining unit. And if so, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held on August 1, 1977 at which time
representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
For about ten years the clerical duties which are the
subject of this case were performed by a bargaining unit
employee classified as as Maintenance Mechanic B.

Those duties

constituted his principal straight time hours assignment.
I consider this extended and undisputed history of
how and by whom the work was performed, to be constructive
if not explicit acknowledgement and acceptance by both sides
that those duties were within the contractual jurisdiction
of the bargaining unit, and hence covered by Article 1 of the
contract.

Particularly so, as here, in the absence of any

-2specific job description.which does not include those duties
within that classification.
That other types of clerical duties elsewhere in the
laboratory have and are being performed by non-bargaining unit
employees is immaterial.

None of those situations had any

history-let alone such an extensive history-of being performed
by a bargaining unit employee as a principal part of his
bargaining unit classification.
That the incumbent bargaining unit employee who
performed that work has now retired does not mean that the
work is lost to the unit, nor does it mean that the Company
may now unilaterally remove it from the unit and assign it to
a non-bargaining unit new hire.
bargaining unit assignment

Having ripened into a

for reasons previously stated,

it must remain so placed unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer has breached the contract
by excluding a new employee hired to
perform plant clerical functions in the
Maintenance Department from the bargaining unit. The Company is directed either
to include that employee within the bargaining unit at a rate of pay to be negotiated
by the parties, or to return the clerical
duties to the Maintenance Mechanic B
classification, or establish a new bargain-
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ing unit job covering those duties
and negotiate with the Union the
wage rate for that job, which, in
my judgement, should be less than
what is paid a Maintenance Mechanic
B.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne
by the Employer.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE
OPINION AND AWARD

and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

At the first hearing on October 13, 1976 the parties
stipulated the issue as:
Whether the Employer violated Section 16(e)
of the collective bargaining agreement by
failing to pay proper wages to John Gazaway,
and if so what shall be the remedy?
Thereafter, on May 24, 1977 I rendered an Opinion and
Award in the case between Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE and Radiant - Technicolor Laboratory.

That

Opinion and Award dealt with the calculation of pay for working
foremen and subforemen under Section 16(e) of the industry-wide
contract.
At the request of the Employer, the instant case was reopened and a second hearing held on August 1, 1977 at which, based
on the evidence and argument of the parties the issue was narrowed
to whether the rates of pay for employees operating the New Eastman
Color Negative II Processor (ECN II) under the separate agreement
between Local 702 and DuArt dated September 17, 1975 are "base
rates" within the meaning of my Opinion and Award in Radiant Technicolor.

(Presumably

the parties felt that with a determina-

tion on that they would be able to claculate the pay of working
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foreman John Gazaway under Section 16(e) of the contract and under
the formula established by my Award in Radiant - Technicolor.
However, that remains unclear because as the Employer (DuArt)
points out in its brief, the parties have yet to fully litigate,
and I have not decided whether "merit increases" are part of "base
rates" within the meaning of Section 16(e), and also unlitigated
is the question, apparently involved in the instant case, of whether
the pay of a working foreman may be compared with an employee within his Department but who works a different shift.)
In Radiant - Technicolor I stated inter alia:
"The parties must have meant that there be
a difference between regular pay and base
rate, because they used two different terms;"
and
"....I must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the
rates found in Schedule A of the contract."
Though I gave some examples of circumstances under which
a "base rate" would be higher than the rates set forth in Schedule
A, I stated that a base rate "does not include incentive earnings,
premium pay, shift differentials or fringe benefits."
In the instant case I do not find that the rates of pay
for the Color Wet Developer Type 3 and the Dry End Man Color Type
3 on the ECN II machine, as set forth in the agreement between the
parties of September 17, 1975, fit within the categories of exceptions to which I referred in Radiant - Technicolor.

Rather I

conclude that the instant disputed rates constitute Schedule A
"base rates" plus a bonus of $.45 and $.30 an hour respectively

-3when the machine is operated by a crew complement of two.
The separate agreement of September 17, 1975 uses the
phrase "special rate."

As in Radiant - Technicolor, I must con-

clude that the parties meant those rates to be different from the
"base rates" because they used a different identifying phrase.
Had they intended the rate for the two operators, made up of the
Schedule A rate for a negative developing machine plus $.45 and
$.30 per hour respectively, to constitute the "base rate",
could and should have said so.

But they did not.

they

Instead they

referred to it as a "special rate", which in my judgement, meant a
base rate to which something else is added, in this case a bonus
or an incentive of $.45 and $.30 per hour respectively, as a quid
pro quo for a willingness to run the machine with only two operators .
The memorandum itself is also supportive of a conclusion
that the rates of pay are in excess of a contractual "base rate."
It expressly provides for the circumstance under which the "specia
rate" is cancelled.

So long as the machine is operated with a

complement of two men the special rate

is applicable, but when

the machine is run on a continuous basis, the crew complement is
then increased to either three or five in accordance with the
manning provisions of the Negative Developing Department as set
forth in the contract, and the "special rate" is cancelled.

To

my mind that means that under circumstances where the crew complement coincides with the contractual manning requirement for negative

-4developing, the operators receive the Schedule A base rate.

When

the crew is reduced to two, those operators are paid more than
the base rate i.e. a bonus or an incentive for the extra work or
attention required by the reduction in complement.

Because they

are demonstrably different, I am unable to conclude that the
higher "special rate" for two operators, and the lesser Schedule
A rate for a complement of three or five operators are both
synonymous with "base rate."
Because it is not certain that with this determination
Gazaway's pay can be calculated under Section 16(e), it is my
ruling that the Arbiteator's fee for this proceeding thus far be
shared equally by the parties.
AWARD
The "special rates" set forth in the
separate agreement between Local 702
and DuArt dated September 17, 1975 are
not "base rates" within the meaning of
Section 16(e) of the contract or my
Award in the Radiant-Technicolor case
dated May 24, 1977.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared
equally by the parties.

DATED: December 1, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this first day of December, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER: U30-l&3»-76 St. Kfi WSfe (J««»« H«v*in«)
AWARD OF ARBITRATOR
1
.HE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
J-H
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
lyi£ " ly/&
anc j having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

Jun«
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
came and appeared

' '"*" "

day of ''-"^* * ~ r

,19

, before me personally

J. 3

to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA-24M-10-76

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 119
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1442 76 M/H

General Electric Company
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article VIII,
Section 3 (b) of the 1973-1976 GE-IUE
National Agreement when it did not grant
service credits to 47 named employees
in Group 50 in the Relay and Component
Operation for the period July 31, 1975
to September 8, 1975? If so, what shall
the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the Philadelphia offices of the
American Arbitration Association on May 18, 1977 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Both sides filed post-

hearing briefs.
On July

30, 1975, at approximately 3:30 PM after receiving

their pay checks for the annual plant vacation shutdown, the
employees referred to in the stipulated issue went on strike.

The

plant vacation shutdown began on August 4 and lasted until August
17, 1975.

Those employees returned to work on September 8, 1975.

The question posed by the parties in this case is a narrow
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one.

It is whether during the period from

August 4, 1975

to August 17, 1975 the forty-seven employees referred to in
the stipulated issue were on vacation or on strike.
There is no dispute that between 3:30 PM on July 30, 1975
and the beginning of the vacation shutdown on August 4, 1975 the
involved employees were on strike; and it is equally undisputed
that from the end of the plant vacation shutdown on August 17, 1975
to September 8, 1975 the employees were also on strike.
The Union contends however that during the period of the
plant vacation shutdown the employees were on vacation and were
not on strike.

The Company asserts that the strike was continuous

from July 30th until September 8th.

It is agreed that if the

employees were on vacation they would be entitled to service
credits pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3(b)of the contract,
but if they viere on strike they would not be entitled to service
credits under that provision of the contract.
I interpret the Union's argument to be that a strike took
place from July 30th to August 4th; that the strike then ended by
virtue of the annual plant shutdown; that the strike began

again

on August 17 when the plant shutdown ended and continued to
September 8, 1975.

I cannot accept this analysis of the events.

Strikes end in many ways; by definitive notice of its termination
by the Union and/or employees involved; by a bilaterally negotiated
settlement with the employer; and by circumstances indicating an
abandonment of the strike by the Union and/or the employees.

But

-3I am not persuaded that there is a "constructive end" to the strike
by the mere intervention of a scheduled annual plant shutdown.
This is especially so in my view when, undisputedly, the strike
commenced before the plant shutdown and employees were still or
again on strike when the shutdown ended.
I see no reason why the status of the affected employees
should not be deemed consistent with the facts.

The facts are,

as I see them, that during the disputed period the employees were
on strike and also on vacation.
and I see no reason

That is what actually occurred,

why those particular and unique circumstances

should be considered mutually inconsistent.

The strike was no more

ended by the bare intervention of the plant vacation shutdown,
then was the vacation period attendant to that shutdown ended by
the strike.

The two conditions factually existed side by side

and simultaneously, and I see no reason to construe either preeminent to the other.
The question then is whether the employees are entitled to
service credits for a period of time during which they were both
on strike and on vacation.

For several reasons I answer that

question in the negative.
The Company concedes that service credits are given for
periods of vacation.

The Union concedes that service credits are

not given for periods of strikes.

And that has been the practice.

There is no practice, nor agreement, nor anything in the contract
to base the grant of service credits for a period of time during

-4which both circumstances take place.
The only variation to the foregoing is the Company's
concession that it does grant service benefits for strikes of no
more' than two weeks duration.

But that concession is supportive

of the Company's position in this case.

It appears, persuasively,

that the practice of granting service credits for strike periods no
greater

than two weeks has been a Company policy and practice

which the Union has accepted and which inter alia was in the
implementation of an internal Company Employee Benefits Bulletin
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, promulgated in
the 1950's and reissued in 1969.

That Company

interpretation

covered various circumstances of overlapping periods of strikes
and vacations, and set forth when, under the contract, service
credits would or would not be granted.
At no time over the ensuing years, including the various
contract negotiations, did the Union dispute, repudiate or seek
to change those interpretations and there is little doubt that
the Union knew of, if not officially notified of, the full content
of those interpretations.
Standing alone, an internal and unilateral Company Bulletin
is not conclusively binding on the Union.

However, it is apparent

to me that over the years the Union accepted those parts of that
Bulletin which were beneficial to it, namely for example, service
credits for strikes of no more than two weeks, service credits
for an employee who was on vacation at the time that a strike

-5commenced, and service credits for employees whose vacation
commencement coincided with the beginning of a strike.

Now,

however, that the instant circumstances have arisen for the
first time, namely the commencement of a strike prior to the beginning of the vacation, the Union claims that it is in no way
bound by that portion of the Company's Bulletin which precisely
covers the instant set of circumstances.

Specifically, the

Bulletin states in pertinent part:
When a strike commences prior to the start
of a scheduled vacation, an employee who is
"on strike" as defined in the first paragraph
on page one, is considered to be "on strike"
for the full period of such strike -- notwithstanding the fact that he may have drawn his
vacation allowance preceding the strike -- and
accordingly will receive no service credits if
the strike exceeds two weeks

And there is no contract provision on this circumstance.
The inconsistency of the Union's position is obvious.

It

cannot treat the Company's Bulletin and the policies implemented
therefrom, as a "chinese menu."

It cannot pick out of it the

things that it likes and reject the things it dislikes, especially
when as here, the things it likes and the benefits it has enjoyed
are rooted in that Bulletin and are not to be found in the collec
tive bargaining agreement.
I agree with the Company that to grant the Union's
grievance would be to give the Union a contract benefit which it

-6repeatedly failed to obtain in contract negotiations.

During

several negotiations the Union sought to obtain service credits
for periods of strikes.

That demand was never agreed to by the

Company and the Union never obtained that benefit.

If, in the

instant case the disputed period was deemed to be solely a period
of vacation, the employees who commenced a strike on July 30,
1975, and did nothing demonstrably thereafter to end the strike
until September 8, 1975, would receive service credits for a
strike spanning that entire period.

In my view that would

accord the Union and employees the very benefit which the Union
failed to obtain in negotiations.

That the employees are and

have been receiving service credits for strike periods of no more
than two weeks is the outside limit of what the Company has done,
and is required to do.

To interpret the contract reference to

"absences of longer than two weeks" to include strikes of two
weeks or less is not to be found in the contract, but comes from
portion of the Bulletin which reads:
a. An employee who is "on strike" as defined
on page 1, shall receive the following service
treatment:
1. Service credits will be granted to all such
employees and will be included in their record
of continuous service for any period of absence
during a strike where the strike does not exceed
two weeks.
L

The burden is on the Union to prove that by the terms of
the contract, or the implementation or practice

thereunder,

-7service credits are to be given for a period of time longer than
two weeks during which employees are both on strike and on vacation.

The Union has not and cannot do so.

Accordingly the Union

has failed to meet its burden of proof in this case, leaving
the matter not for arbitration, but for negotiations.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article VIII,
Section 3 (b) of the 1973-1976 GE-IUE
National Agreement when it did not grant
service credits to 47 named employees in
group 50 in the Relay and Component Operation
for the period July 31, 1975 to September 8,
1975.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 8, 1977

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers, Local
707, AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Expedited Case #53 30 0275 77

General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Manuel Corpe? If not what shall be the
remedy?
Mr. Corpe, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", was
discharged for falsifying his expense account.

He sought payment

for lodging in the amount of $18.28, an expense he did not incur.
There is no question that the Company has the right to
discharge an employee who falsifies an expense account.

However

it is also well settled that an employer must exercise that right
uniformly and consistently with regard to all employees who commit
that offense and are otherwise similarly situated.
The grievant's case is compared with that of Howard Parry,
who nine years earlier was suspended for one week and given a
letter of reprimand for receiving meal allowances for breakfast
and lunch when in actuality he had those meals at home rather than
on the road.
I agree with the Company that there are differences between
the Parry case and that of the grievant.

But I do not agree that

the differences are so sharp and material as to justify a one week
suspension for the former and the ultimate penalty of discharge for
the latter.
The Company asserts that Parry was a long service employee
and that the grievant was of "relatively short service."

As I see

-2it, Parry with twenty years of service was a long service employee
but the grievant with eleven years of service had relatively long
service tenure.

The Company argues that the grievant wilfully

falsified his expense account, seeking money which he did not expend; but that Parry only received meal money because it was "preprepared" on the expense account.

The fact is that Parry either

received, or permitted the meal expense to stand, when he knew or
should have known that he was not entitled to it.

As I see it, as

between the grievant and Parry the question of wilfullness is only
a matter of degree.

The Company points out that Parry had a "good

disciplinary record", but that the grievant's disciplinary record
was "poor."

Obviously the grievant'& disciplinary record has not

been "good", but on the other hand I would not characterize it as
"poor." His "active" record for purposes of consideration herein,
includes two written warning notices, one for "failure to follow
instructions" and the other for attendance infractions; and some
oral admonitions for "failure to wear his uniform," but he has
received no disciplinary suspensions.
The comparison of these two cases, the only ones introduced into the record which involve expense account improprieties,
leads me to conclude that if Parry received a one week suspension
and a written reprimand the grievant, whose offense was only to
'
some degree more serious, whose record was only less satisfactory
than Parry's and did not include a prior disciplinary suspension,
should have been disciplined more severely than Parry but not
discharged.
Under these particular circumstances I think it appropriate,
adequate and consistent with the way the Company handled the prior

-3Parry case for the grievant to suffer a disciplinary suspension
for the period of time since his discharge.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Manuel Corpe is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated without back pay and the
period of time between his discharge and
reinstatement shall be deemed the period
of his disciplinary suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 7, 1977
COUNTY OF New York )
STATE OF New York
) '"
On this seventh day of October, 1977, before me personally?
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 119, International Union of
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1430 1637 77M/H
N.D« No. 52,924

and
General

Electric

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discipline
imposed on forty identified employees
for their conduct on April 29, 1977 which
the Company alleges was in violation of
Article XIV, Section I of the contract?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on June 28,
1978 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross^examine witnesses.
A stenographic record was taken, and the Company filed a posthearing brief.
The Company disciplined each of the forty grievants with a
warning letter for their alleged violations of the "no strike"
provisions of the contract.
I conclude that the forty identified grievants engaged in
a work stoppage for about one hour on April 29, 1977 within the
meaning and proscriptions of Article XIV Section I of the contract
It is apparent that they did so to protest the Company's action of

-2turning off the heat in the plant and the reduced temperature
that resulted.
Assuming the accuracy of the Union's position on how cold
the plant became, I do not find that it created such an unsafe
or otherwise exceptional condition as to constitute a "safety
exception" to the rule that disputes are not to be dealt with by
a work stoppage but rather are to be grieved and arbitrated. The
plant may have been more cold than warm, but it was not imminently
dangerous

to the employees, a condition which must be present to

properly invoke the "safety exception" to the aforementioned rule.
Moreover, I do not believe that the then temperature level
required wearing outer clothes, which, if so required, might
interfere with the safe operation of the machines.

Hence it is

immaterial whether some employees wore them that day.

Thus if

the Union protested the Company's policy of turning off the
comfort heat in April, or if the work conditions were uncomfortable because of the reduced temperature, those matters should
have been grieved and if not resolved, arbitrated, under the
available grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.
Additionally, if, as the record seems to indicate, the
Company acted disingenuously by attributing the lack of heat to a
mechanical problem, and only later disclosing that it was due to
its policy to shut off heat annually in April (a policy which had
been followed and known to the Union and the employees in prior

-3years)

that too is exclusively for the grievance and arbitra-

tion provisions of the contract.

As I see it, the arbitration

forum is fully capable of redressing that matter and those
circumstances either by arbitral directives for the future and/or
by admonitions to the Company, if the arbitrator finds that the
Company either misled the Union and the employees about the real
reason for the lack of heat, or that the Company's policy was
unreasonable or a contract breach.

If the present grievance and

arbitration provisions of the contract are not jurisdictionally
adequate or not expeditious enough to handle such immediate
matters, that problem must be left for collective bargaining,
and not for self help.
The instant facts, though indicating some lack of frankness
by the Company representatives with the employees and the Union,
for which I am critical of the Company, did not however rise to
the level of provocation which would excuse the work stoppage.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discipline
imposed on forty identified employees
for their conduct on April 29, 1977.

DATED: October 9, 1977

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 301
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15 30 0217 77

and
General Electric Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XXVIII, Section
1 of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE National Agreement and
the Local Understanding on Job Posting and Upgrading on November 22, 1976 when Frederick Berg
was upgraded to Group Leader-Foundry Service rather
Merlin Luther Dexter? If so, what shall the remedy
be?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York on July 11, 1977
at which time Mr. Dexter, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record of the pro-

ceedings was taken, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article XXVII Section 1 reads:
1. Standard for filling open jobs and upgrading
The Company will, to the extent practical, give
first consideration for job openings and upgrading
to present employees, when employees with the necessary qualifications are available. In upgrading
employees to higher rated jobs, the Company will
take into consideration as an important factor,
the relative length of continuous service of the
employees who it finds are qualified for such upgrading.

,. __
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The foregoing contract language, particularly the phrase:
"....who it finds are qualified for such upgrading." (emphasis added)
vests the Company with the unilateral and discretionary authority
to determine which employees are qualified to be given consideration for a promotion.

Of course the Company may not abuse that

discretion or exercise it in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
In the instant case the Company determined that the grievant
was not qualified for promotion to the job Group Leader-Foundry
Service despite his conceded qualifications in his incumbent
position, Foundry Service, and despite his significantly greater
seniority than that of Frederick Berg, who was given the promotion!.
It cannot be seriously disputed that a Group Leader job requires not only leadership abilities but also the capability of
working cooperatively and smoothly with both supervision and
whatever group of employees are assigned to the Group Leader.
Consequently, leadership attributes and a work history of dealing
with supervision and in directing groups of employees are relevant
in judging qualifications for upgrading to the Group Leader
classification.
Considering the substantial evidence adduced by the Company
regarding the grievant's resistance to supervisory

instruction;

his abrasive and argumentative attitude toward other employees;
his reluctance to follow certain safety requirements; and some
disciplinary problems, I cannot conclude that the Company either
abused its discretion or acted arbitrary or capricious in

-3-

determining that he was not qualified for the Group LeaderFoundry Service job.

It is undisputed that Berg had none of

these disabilities.
The Union's principal point in support of the grievant, namely
his service as an acting foreman in the Department, when examined
is not supportive of the grievant's claim for a promotion.

His

service as Acting Foreman, in my judgement,
was for too short a
~
period of time to be determinative, and significantly, during
that tenure he expressed in unmistakable terms his dislike for
the job and sought to be relieved of it.

That circumstance reason

ably demonstrates an unsuitability for a job requiring not only
leadership capabilities but a proper leadership attitude.
Assuming arguendo that the grievant met the requisite qualifications for upgrading to the Group Leader position, the foregoing contract provision would still not mandate his promotion.
The relevant contract clause does not require the Company to
promote the senior employee if he is qualified.

Instead it re-

quires that the Company "take into consideration as an important
factor" the relative seniority of those qualified.
In the instant case, despite the Union's assertion to the
contrary, I am satisfied that the Company did consider the
grievant prior to making its determination that he was unqualified
The consideration was informal, and he was not interviewed.

But

I do not find a contractual obligation to undertake formal interviews or other structured procedures in order to meet the

-4"consideration" requirement of Article XXVII Section 1.

And,

on the assumption that the grievant's record in dealings with
supervision and other employees, as previously referred to, did
not render him unqualified, I still cannot conclude that the
Company's selection of Berg was an abuse of the Company's
discretion, arbitrary or capricious, or violative of Article
XXVIII Section 1.

Though the grievant's greater seniority is

"an important factor", the Company's conclusion that his negative
work attitudes and expressed dislike of the only leadership
function he ever performed outweighed his greater seniority,
was not inconsistent with the evaluative rights of the Company
under Article XXVIII Section 1 of the contract.
In view of the agreement of the parties that the "Job Interest
Card" is not involved in determining the issue in this case, I
find nothing in the Local Understanding on Job Posting and Upgrading which would change the foregoing conclusion.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article XXVIII
Section 2 of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE National
Agreement and the Local Understanding on
Job Posting and Upgrading on November 22,
1976 when Frederick Berg was upgraded to
Group Leader-Foundry Service rather than
Merlin Luther Dexter.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: October 13, 1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this thirteenth day of October, 1977, before me personall
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Not

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Insurance Workers International Union

AWARD OF
ARBITRATORS
Case #1330 0155 76

and
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators under
the arbitration agreement between the above named parties and
dated June 25, 1975, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties, make the following AWARD:
1. Based on the record the fourteen District
Agents involved participated in a violation of Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement on September 2, 1975. The one
day disciplinary suspension and the warning
letters given to each of them are upheld.
2. In the interest of due process under evidentiary rules for establishing the occurence of
a "concerted action" the individual grievants
or the Union on their behalf shall be accorded
the opportunity to expunge the foregoing disciplinary penalties by proving to the Company
that not only did they not make in-person
collections of premiums on their debits during
the period from the prior Thursday, but that
in fact there were no mailed in premiums in
their mail boxes or otherwise available for
deposit on September 2, 1975. Appeals under
this portion of the AWARD shall be subject to
the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: May 10, 1977
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Sam B. Wander
Concurring in No. 1
above.
Dissenting from No.
above.

Frank H. Zaruba
Dissenting From No. 1
above.
Concurring in No. 2
above.

DATED: May 10, 1977
STATE OF New York )SSt .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this tenth day of May, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1977

On this
of May, 1977, before me personally came
and appeared Sam B. Wander to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1977

On this
of May, 1977, before me personally came
and appeared Frank H, Zaruba to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Insurance Workers International Union

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 0155 76

and
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company

In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement effective June 25, 1975 between John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
and Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union", the Undersigned was designated as the
Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide,
together with the Union and Company designees to said Board the
following stipulated issue:
Whether the 14 district agents involved
participated in a violation of Article
IV of the collective bargaining agreement
on September 2, 1975, and if so, whether
the disciplinary action taken by the Company
as outlined in the letters of September 29,
1975, was warranted? And if not, what shall
be the appropriate remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City on September 16 and 17,
1976 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs.

Sam B. Wander and Frank H. Zaruba served respectively as the
Company and Union designees to the Board of Arbitration.

Follow-
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ing submission of post-hearing briefs by both sides, the Board
of Arbitration met in executive session on March 8, 1977.
The fourteen district agents involved, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievants", are charged with engaging in a "concerted
action" within the meaning and in violation of Article IV, by
refusing or willfully

failing to make deposits of premium collec-

tions or "mail payments" on Tuesday September 2, 1975, a scheduled
"report" day.
The Company contends that the grievant's action constituted
a "slowdown" as defined by the following portion of Article IV:
"The term 'slowdown' as used in this Article
shall mean, but not by way of limitation,
concerted action by a group of Agents for
the purpose of coercing the Company into
granting their demands by the willful cessation or reduction of normal business activity."
There is no dispute that under Paragraph C of Article IV
the Company "may discipline
ing in or encouraging
contract

"

any District Agents participatslowdown during the term of this

In the instant case the Company imposed a one

day disciplinary suspension on each of the grievants, and gave
each a written warning.
It is also uncontested that the Company procedure and
policy requires Agents to deposit premiums collected or received
during the prior week, on the first office report day each week,
(usually Tuesday), and to particularize and update those collections (as to source and policy credit) on the next office report
day (usually Thursday).

-3The Company scheduled Tuesday September 2nd as the first
"report" day following the Labor Day weekend.

It is undisputed

that each of the fourteen grievants made no deposits that day.
The Company's case is simply that it is beyond reasonable
explanation, except as a concerted action, for a group of Agents
to have made no premium collections or received no mail payment
premiums for deposit on that day; that for all fourteen not to
make deposits was their collective angry response to the
Company's change in the report day from the Wednesday following
Labor Day weekend to the earlier Tuesday of September 2nd, and
that their group action was a "willful cessation or reduction of
normal business activity" as proscribed by Article IV of the
contract.
The Union vigorously denies any concerted action or slowdown by the grievants.

It argues, together with the testimony

of some of the grievants, that none of the grievants collected
premiums during the period from the prior Thursday to Tuesday,
September 2, 1975; that it was not their practice to open their
mail and deposit mail payments on a Tuesday "report" day (but
held the mail payments received or available on that day for the
following Thursday); that the absence of collections during this
period is explained by the Labor Day weekend; that at least two
of the grievants could not be held responsible for failure to
deposit collections because one was on vacation during the
preceding week and the other took the time off from work because

-4of family commitments (Messrs. Valenti and DePalma respectively);
and that in any event the Company has produced no evidence of
collusion, explicit cooperation between or among the grievants,
instructions from one or more to the others, or any other indicia
of understandings to collectively withhold deposits which are the
requisites of any legal conclusion that a "concerted action" was
undertaken.

And finally, that the test of a concerted action

within the meaning of Article IV has not been met, because the
Company has not shown that the grievants acted "for the purpose
of coercing the Company into granting their demands

"

The parties need not be reminded that this is a civil,
disciplinary case where the standard of proof is less than is
required in criminal and possibly other statutory proceedings.
As in other similar civil matters, such as unfair trade allegations, price fixing, or civil conspiracies, the charge of
"concerted action" may be proved and satisfied by other than
direct evidence of collusion, coordinated group participation
or a collectively planned and executed action.

Rather a

"concerted action" like price-fixing, monopolistic practices
and conspiracy may be proved by substantial evidence of unusual
surrounding circumstances which defy other reasonable or logical
explanations, which go beyond the bounds of reasonable coincidence,
and which sharply exceed the parameters of ordinary probability.
Based on the record before me the instant case meets this
latter circumstantial test, at least for disciplinary purposes.

-5-

I do not accept either the testimony or the assertion that
it has not been the practice of the grievants to deposit on
Tuesdays, mail payments that are in their mail boxes on those
days.

The Company's testimony that the debits of the grievants

were of the types on which eighty percent of the premiums were
paid by mail, stands unrefuted on the record.

Coupled with

the statements of those certain grievants that their normal
deposits or recordings of premiums collected, on the regular
Tuesday office report days range from $100 to $600 or more,
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the bulk of the deposit
come from payments mailed in.

It follows that on Tuesdays, the

payments deposited and recorded on that day, came, in the
regular course, from mail paid premiums which are in the mail
boxes of the agents when they report in each Tuesday.

Conse-

quently for fourteen of twenty District Office Agents not to
examine, open and/or make use of what was in their mail boxes
on September 2, 1975 was not only contrary to both their
individual and collective past practice, but to deem it simply
as an act of each agent individually is beyond the bounds of
coincidence or reasonable probability.

Rather the only logical

and acceptable explanation is that in some form or other the
fourteen grievants, out of the twenty Agents in that office,
agreed collectively and in concert to vary their regular practice
and not make use of the premiums in the mail whether or not they
made any in-person collections during the preceding week.

-6In support of the foregoing conclusion I am satisfied
that because of the quantity of deposits on prior Tuesdays as
a matter of practice, and because of the undisputed fact that
eighty percent of the premiums on the debits involved were paid
by mail the Company had reasonable grounds to believe and
conclude that the grievants had payments in their mail boxes on
September 2 which they could have used to make the deposits
requested by the District Office Manager.

On that basis the

Company has made out a clear prima facia case of the availability
of mail paid premiums.

For reasons later stated, I hold that

under that circumstance any grievant to whom that situation did
not apply had the duty to explicitly demonstrate his different
status.

The mere additional assertion by the Agents that they

did not know whether such premiums were available, or did not
know if they had mail in their mail boxes, are inadequate arguments
in rebuttal.

And that includes Messrs. Valenti and DePalma,

who, even if excused from in person collections during the
preceding week when they were respectively on vacation or on
personal business failed to satisfactorily explain their failure
to use mailed in deposits when both of them were in the office
on Tuesday, September 2, and knew at the latest on that day
that it was a scheduled

day for "reporting-in" and making

deposits .
On the matter of probability, it is uncontested that an
individual agent only rarely has no deposits to make on a

-7Tuesday for the period from the preceding Thursday.

It is also

unchallenged that never before has such a large group (i.e.
fourteen) had no deposits to make.

The latter circumstance is

not only unprecedented but defies probability, and consequently,
constitutes probative evidence of a willful and concerted plan
by the individuals involved.
The suggestion that fourteen agents had nothing to deposit
on September 2, 1975 because of the intervening Labor Day weekend is not persuasive.

The Company offered substantial evidence

to show that in other similar situations where there was an
intervening holiday on the day before a reporting day, the
agents made significant and representative deposits consistent
with their regular averages.

Consequently for the Tuesday

following Labor Day to be so radically different is, as part of
the total picture, further probative evidence of a collective
plan or concerted action to withhold deposits.
To my mind, any inconclusiveness with regard to the foregoing analysis is ended when viewed against the backdrop of
what the Company characterizes as prior "job actions" by most
of the same agents involved in this case.

The Company has

offered testimony and evidence of at least two prior collective
actions by twelve or thirteen of these grievants.

In January

1975 they conducted or participated in a union meeting

during

regular office hours and later in the same month failed to come
to work on time, calling in inLarge numbers with the same excuse

-8- car trouble.

The Company officially characterized both

incidents as violations of Article IV of the contract, and
though the Union protested that characterization, the grievance
it filed in response to disciplinary action taken with regard
to one of them was not carried to arbitration.

Hence the

Company's characterization, unchallenged by the Union to the
point of adjudication, must stand as part of the prior record
of this district office and of virtually all of the grievants
involved in the instant incident.

In short, based upon earlier

events, I must conclude that the circumstantial factors surrounc
ing the September 2, 1975 incident add up to substantial evidence
of another in a series of concerted actions or "self help"
by these employees in protest over some decision or action by
the Company.
Finally, I disagree with the Union's contention that the
Company cannot prove a concerted action because it has not
shown a "purpose of coercing the Company into granting (a)
demand."

The record adequately establishes that the grievants

had a motive or purpose for their refusal or failure to make
deposits.

Clearly, they were objecting to the change in the

reporting day following Labor Day from VJednesday to the earlier
Tuesday.

Indeed, when the District Manager learned that

deposits were not being made, and inquired of the Union office
representative as to the reason or whether "there was a problem",
Mr. Juliana candidly indicated that there had been too many

-9changes in the office; that Wednesdays and Thursdays had been
the reporting days and that the change to a Tuesday report day
was "too many changes."

Though Juliana also stated that the

agents didn't have any money to deposit because it was Tuesday
after Labor Day, I am persuaded that his statement reflected
and represented the collective anger of the grievants over the
change from a Wednesday report day to the earlier Tuesday.
Therefore it is both logical and reasonable to conclude that
what the grievants intended was to force the Company into rescheduling report days following holidays and to generally
protest, and change what the grievants viewed as "too many
changes" in that district office, following the arrival of
District Manager Guralnick.

I consider this enough to meet

not only the general test of purpose or motive in connection
with establishing a "concerted action" from surrounding
circumstances, but also to meet the test of the meaning of the
term "slow down" in the second paragraph of Article IV of the
contract.
A word on the burden of proof.

I have held that based on

well settled evidentiary rules, a series of circumstances may,
cumulatively constitute probative evidence of concerted action
by a group of employees similarly situated, without the need
of proving the willful involvement of each member of the group.
For disciplinary purposes direct evidence of the explicit
participation, collusion and active cooperation of each member

-10of the group or other direct "smoking gun" evidence is not
essential to prove the elements of concerted action as a
civil offense.

On balance, a different rule would unduly

impede redress of concerted abuses of contract requirements
because of the difficulty in proving that those involved acted
as a group or in concert.

Of course there is always the

danger that some innocent individual may be caught up in what
is deemed to have been a group action.

In that event the

investigative and adjudicatory process must afford any such
individual full due process opportunity to establish noninvolvement.

But the burden is on such an individual to come

forward with probative evidence which would distinguish him
from the group with which he appears to be identified.
the grievants did not do so, or their defenses were
to meet that burden.

Here,

inadequate

Accordingly I uphold the Company's case

herein, but because the Union and the grievants may not have
anticipated that burden, I shall reserve the right of any of
the grievants to present to the Company evidence of their noninvolvement in the events of September 2; particularly that
they not only made no in-person collections of premiums from
the prior Thursday but that

in fact there were no mail

payment premiums in their mail boxes or otherwise available
for deposit on the reporting day of September 2, 1975.

Any

such appeals by any of the individual grievants or the Union
on their behalf will be subject to the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Insurance Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD OF
ARBITRATORS
Case #13 30 0269 76

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators
under the arbitration agreement dated June 25, 1975 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
make the following AWARD:
The termination of Agent Douglas Bussing
was for just and sufficient cause under
the terms of the collective bargaining
contract and was with due regard for his
reasonable rights.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Neil Smith
Concurring

Arthur H. Higginson
Dissenting
DATED: August 8, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighth day of August, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Insurance Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO
and

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #12 30 0269 76

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company

In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement effective June 25, 1975 between John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", and
Insurance Workers International Union, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union", the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of a
tri-partite board of arbitration to hear and decide, together
with the Union and Company designees to said Board, the following
stipulated issue:
Whether the termination of Agent Douglas
Bussing was for just and sufficient cause
under the terms of the collective bargaining contract with with due regard for his
reasonable rights? If not, what should be
the remedy?
Hearings were held in Bridgeport, Connecticut on March
15th and 16th, 1977 at which time representatives of the parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs.

Neil Smith and Arthur H. Higginson served respectively as the
Company and Union arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The

The Board of Arbitration met in

executive session on August 8, 1977.
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Let me come right to the point, as I see it.

I do not

find in this case that the Company imposed specific productivity
standards on Mr. Bussing or that he was discharged for failing
to meet any such explicit standards.
Hence, what is not part of this case is whether the
Company can establish specific production
standards or minimums,
.
or whether any such policy if applied to Bussing or otherwise
would be a proscribed effort by the Company to obtain what the
Union asserts the Company failed to obtain when it withdrew
Demand #9 in the 1975 contract negotiations.
Rather, in this case I find and conclude that Bussing
was terminated for failure to sell insurance in reasonable amounts!
That obligation 1 find to be a fundamental and inherent obligation attendant to his employment, whether or not the contract
contained the language "will sell the products of the Company...
..." as found in Article XVI Section 2.

I am persuaded that

that language was negotiated into the contract as a codification
of the implicit and inherent obligation of an agent to sell
insurance policies in reasonable amounts.
To my mind, an agent's sales activities must be
sufficiently quantative in terms of selling the Company's product
in order to make his continued employment economically tolerable
if not worthwhile.

Without particularizing herein there can be

no serious dispute Bussing's sales record for an extended and
relevant period of time was manifestly unsatisfactory and below

-3-

any level of reasonableness.

His exceedingly poor sales record

continued unimproved after several warnings and after he was
given specific opportunities by the Company to improve.

The

record amply demonstrates that for a lengthy and continuing
period his sales income was considerably less than what the
Company was obligated to pay him in guaranteed wages and benefits
By comparison with others similarly classified his sales record
was by far the worst, achieving such a small percentage of the
average of others as to be incontestably unreasonable in quantity
In that regard, without any consideration of specific
sales standards, he failed to meet an essential condition of his
job; a condition I have held to be an implicit and integral part
of the employment relationship, and per force therefore, an
obligation of an agent under the contract.
I conclude that it was on that ground, namely that he
failed to sell insurance in reasonable quantities, that the
Company imposed the discharge penalty.

That circumstance meets

the "just cause" test within the meaning of the collective bargain
ing agreement.
The Union asserts that the Company failed to give "due
regard" to Bussing's reasonable rights by not transferring him
from the Office Debit he occupied when he was terminated to a
Regular Debit where he had worked earlier.
the Union's assertion.

I cannot agree with

I find nothing in the contract which

obligated the Company to make that transfer.

Itcould have done

-4so but was not required to do so.

The earlier arbitration case

involving Mileski upheld the Company's right to assign agents
from an Office Debit to a Regular Debit when the former debit
was eliminated.

But that Award does not require the Company

to accord any such transfer or reassignment to an Office Debit
agent when his productivity is unsatisfactory.

Moreover, the

record is unclear as to whether the Office Debit or the Regular
Debit affords greater sales and earning opportunities.

For that

reason and also in view of his previously expressed objections
to any such transfer I cannot conclude that Bussing would have
done better if the transfer had been made, even assuming that
a Regular Debit was available (which the Company disputes).
In sum I find that the Company discharged the grievant
for failure to make sales in reasonable amounts and that the
obligation of an agent to do so, as codified in Article XVI
Section 2 of the contract, is an implicit and inherent requirement which existed even before that contract section was negotiated
Bussing was not discharged for failure to meet any specific
productivity level nor because he failed to comply with a plan
or policy which attempted to impose or implement the establishment of specific productivity standards.

As the Company was not

obligated to affectuate his transfer to a different debit, and
because it appears most unlikely that any such transfer would have
helped Bussing's sales record, the Company did not fail to give
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due regard to Bussing's reasonable rights.

Accordingly the

grievance is denied and the discharge is sustained.

Eric J. Schmert;
Chairman

August 9, 1977

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Glass Bottle Blowers Association,
Local 145, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1852 75

and
Johns-Manville Products Corporation

In accordance with Article XX Step 5 of the collective
bargaining agreement dated March 6, 1973 between the Glass
Bottle Blowers Association, Local 145, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union", and Johns-Manville Products Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company", the Undersigned was
selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Is the grievant Richard Hoffman entitled
to holiday pay for Memorial Day and July
4, 1975 under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on
March 11, 1977, at which time representatives of the Union and
Company and Mr. Hoffman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses .
Subsequent to the hearing the parties waived the contractual time limit for rendition of the Award.

-2The grievant was on a medical or disability leave of
absence from May 12 to August 11, 1975.

The two holidays

for which he claims holiday pay fell within that period.
The pertinent contract section is Article XV Sections 1 and
2.

Section 1 includes Memorial Day and July 4th as paid

holidays.

Section 2 reads:

On each of the above holidays, all
employees shall be paid for eight
(8) hours at their straight-time job
rate whether or not they performed
any work, provided that the employee
works his scheduled day first preceding and next following the holiday and
on the holiday if scheduled by the Company. These requirements do not apply
where the employee has been excused by
his supervisor.
The Union contends that the grievant meets the requirements
of Section 2.

It claims that he worked "his scheduled day

first preceding and next following the holiday

"

It argues

that the last day he worked before beginning his medical or
disability

leave constituted "his scheduled day first preceding

....the holiday", and that the day he returned to work from that
leave of absence was his "scheduled day next.... following the
holiday

" Alternatively the Union asserts that the grievant's

medical or disability leave of absence meets the test of an
"excuse" from the Section 2 requirements within the meaning of
the last sentence of that Section.

Moreover the Union claims

that other employees have been granted holiday pay while they
were on leaves of absence, and that arbitration cases generally
support the Union's interpretation of the foregoing

contract

-3section.
The Union's case is not persuasive.

The parties no doubt

are familiar with the statement that "the facts may be within
the letter of the law but not within its intent."

I am convinced

that Section 2 of Article XVII was not intended to apply to
employees on medical or disability leaves of abdence.

Rather

it presupposes that an employee is actively employed at the time
that a paid holiday occurs.

The requirement that the employee

be scheduled work days before and following the holiday is obvious 1\d

time off.

To deem the last day that the grievant worked and the

first day of his return to employment following his disability
leave, as meeting the requirements of "working his scheduled
day preceding and following the holiday" is a tortured and unorthodox interpretation.

And to interpret a leave of absence

as equivalent to having been "excused by his supervisor" is
similarly

insupportable and unreasonable.

Moreover, a medical or disability leave of absence is without pay.

An employee on such a leave of absence is not actively

employed.

To grant him holiday pay during that period of time

is inconsistent with the non-pay status of the leave and
contrary to the previously enunciated principle that Section 2
is applicable to employees actively employed at the time the
holiday occurs.
So far as "past practice" is concerned the Union was able

-4to show only one instance in which an employee on a similar
leave of absence received holiday pay for a holiday which
fell within the period of his leave.

Contrarywise

the Company

demonstrated that in all other cases, and there have been a
significant number, holiday pay was not given to employees
while on medical or disability leaves.

Therefore, if there

has been a past practice, it has been overwhelmingly contrary
to the Union's position herein.
Finally, the Union cites several arbitration decisions in
other contractual relationships which purport to support the
Union's contentions herein.

Not only are those cases not

binding because they evolved from different contractual
relationships, but my research discloses a significant number
of arbitration cases, probably a majority, which hold the other
way.
For all the foregoing reasons the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
Richard Hoffman is not entitled to holiday
pay for Memorial Day and July 4th, 1975.

Erit J. Schmer/:z
Aroitrator
DATED: April 28, 1977

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 584 IBT

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0628 77
and

The Hertz Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Company in violation of the contract
by assigning non bargaining unit employees
to perform the work of servicing and gassing
milk delivery vehicles? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 18, 1977 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties filed post-

hearing briefs.
With the closing of the "milk city" location and the transfer
of the milk delivery vehicles in question to other locations,
the Company assigned non bargaining unit employees at the latter
locations to perform the work of servicing and gassing those milk
delivery vehicles which was previously performed by bargaining
unit employees at the "milk city" location.
I find that this violated Section 2 paragraph 3 of the
contract.
A "move of (a) depot or other facilities to any other location within the Metropolitan area" may be voluntary or involuntary

-2and still fall within the meaning of Section 2 paragraph 3 of
the contract.

It may also be the establishment of a new facility

or, as here, a new use of an existing facility.

Hence that

"milk city" was closed not by the Company, but by the owner of
that facility, requiring the Company to find other locations at
which it would service and gas the trucks it leased to various
milk companies, is no less a "move of a facility" within the
meaning of Section 2 paragraph 3 than if the Company
the move on its own initiative.

implemented

Section 2 paragraph 3 places no

limitations, conditions or exceptions on how or why a facility
is "moved."

Accordingly I conclude that the Company's need to

find new locations to place and service the milk delivery (and
other) trucks leased to various milk companies, and its transfer
of trucks to various other locations from "milk city" to meet that
need, constituted a "move" of a "facility" to other locations
within the Metropolitan area within the meaning of Section 2 paragraph 3 of the contract.
Therefore, under the balance of the language of that contract
clause, the collective bargaining agreement between the Company
and the Union "remain(ed) applicable and shall cover the employees
at the new location."

On that basis, employees of the local 584

IBT bargaining unit had the right to be assigned, and if necessary
to follow the work they had been doing at "milk city" - namely
the servicing and gassing of the milk delivery trucks which had
been transferred from "milk city" to other locations.

-3I do not read the NLRB jurisdictional decisions to negate
the

foregoing conclusion.

Those decisions decided a juris-

dictional work issue between Locals 584 and 447 (both IBT) at
the milk city depot.

In pertinent part the decisions awarded

the servicing and maintenance of non-milk trucks to Local 447
and the servicing and maintenance of milk delivery trucks to
Local 584.

Relying on that part of the Board's Opinion that

states:
"However, at the time that Local 447 assented
to the Employer's assumption of the agreement
that Local 584 and Holland were parties to,
it was, at least as disclosed by the record,
understood that the work would encompass only
the maintenance and servicing of the milk
trucks at the Holland garage"(i0e. "milk city"
EJS)
the Company contends that the Union's jurisdiction was and is
limited to milk city, and that that jurisdiction is lost if any
of the vehicles the Union serviced there are transferred elsewhere, particularly when any such transfer is for bona fide
business or other legitimate reasons and especially if, as here,
the Company made a good faith but unsuccessful effort to place
the trucks at locations where local 584 employees could continue
to service and maintain them.
that way.

I do not read the Board decision

As I see it the Board decided which work at milk city

was to be done respectively by Locals 584 and 447 under their
contracts with the Company, and pursuant to the jurisdictional
dispute settlement procedures of the National Labor Relations Act.
:

The foregoing quoted portion of the Board's decision was, in my

-4opinion, designed to make clear that Local 584 did not have the
right to claim new work or jurisdiction in connection with the
servicing and maintenance of milk delivery trucks outside of the
milk city location.

But it does not, and in my judgement was not

intended to answer the question of whether bargaining unit
employees of Local 584 could follow or otherwise retain work
jurisdiction over old or existing work which had been assigned t
and regularly performed by them at the milk city location prior
to its transfer elsewhere.
not before The Board.

That latter factual situation was

Consequently the stated question arising

therefrom, not dealt with or determined by the Board, may be
answered only by resort to the applicable provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.

As previously stated, the

applicable contract provision is Section 2 paragraph 3, and I
have interpreted it and applied it as supportive of the Union's
grievance herein.
I am satisfied that the Company made a good faith effort
to place the trucks in question at locations where Local 584
employees could continue to perform the disputed work.

Indeed,

a number of trucks not involved in this dispute were so located
and Local 584 bargaining unit employees "followed that work" to
the new locations.

However the Arbitrator does not have the

power to relieve the Company of a contractual obligation merely
because of the Company's good faith efforts, or because, more
specifically, the Company sought to comply with what appears to

-5be an understanding or "custom and practice" between the two
local unions that Local 584 and Local 447 members "do not work
side by side."

That "understanding" is not part of the contract

ual obligation nor is adherence to it required by law, and there
fore cannot be the basis for an arbitrator's decision, though
I am cognizant of and respect the practical considerations on
which it is based.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The work of servicing and gassing the 13
milk delivery trucks in question which was
performed by Local 584 bargaining unit members when located at "milk city", but which
has been done by Local 447 members at other
locations following the closing of milk city
and the transfer of those trucks to other
locations, shall be reassigned to and continue
to be performed by the Local 584 bargaining
unit.
The location of that reassignment is discretionary
with the Company, except that it shall be within the geographical area covered by the contract.
That this may mean that Local 584 and Local 447
members must work at the same location is neither
barred by the contract nor by law. It is a
matter which, if this Award is so implemented,
must be worked out by the parties involved.
I find that one Local 584 bargaining unit employee
whose identity is known to the parties, did suffer
a period of layoff as a result of the events involved in this matter. He shall be made whole for
the period of his layoff.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: December 24, 1977
STATE OF: New York ) ss>:
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this the twenty-fourth day of December, 1977, before
me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me tha
he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 7770, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0044 77

and
International Silver Company
The stipulated issue is:
Is the dispute arbitrable?
If so, was Eva King denied weekly disability income benefits by the Company's
insurance carrier in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement? If so
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Wallingford, Connecticut on July 17
and August 22, 1977 at which time Ms. King, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunit

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Company filed

a post-hearing brief.
The dispute is arbitrable.

It is well settled that where

the grievance alleges a breach of a specific contract provision,
and where the subject matter of the grievance is the same as or
reasonably related to the subject matter of the clause specified,
the grievance is arbitrable. Whether the contract clause cited
supports the Union's case involves the merits of the dispute, not
its arbitrability.

-2Here the dispute concerns a claim for "Weekly Disability
Income" benefits.
of the contract.

The Union alleges a breach of Article XXVIII
That Article deals with "Group Insurance",

including, specifically "Weekly Disability Income."

Accordingly

as the grievance involves a claim substantively related to the
contract section which the Union alleges has been breached, the
requirement of arbitrability has been met.
On the merits however, the grievant's quarrel is not with
the Company, but rather with the Company's insurance carrier.

On

that basis, and under the specific conditions and limitations set
forth in the last paragraph of ArticleXXVIII, the Company is not
contractually

liable if its insurance carrier, as here, declares

a claimant ineligible for weekly disability income benefits.
The last paragraph of Article 2fVIII reads:
In all other respects, the provisions
of the above plans remain unchanged and
eligibility for the increased benefits
are subject to the standard practices
and provisions required by the insurance
carrier.
I interpret the phrase "increased benefits" set forth in
S

the foregoing to mean the enumerated benefits of Article XVIII,
including, as relevant to this case, the explicit provision for
Weekly Disability Income.

In my view, it would be illogical and

wrong to interpret the phrase "increased benefits" to mean only
the difference between the present level of benefits and the lower
levels of those benefits under the prior contract.

Rather, the
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phrase "increased benefits" is obviously synonymous with the
present benefits of Article XXVIII.

Indeed it is the present

contract benefit as "increased" from the prior contract that the
grievant seeks in this proceeding, and what she applied for in
her claim to the Company's insurance carrier.
The foregoing contract provision explicitly conditions the
granting or denial of benefits on the "standard practices and
provisions required by the insurance carrier."

In the instant

circumstance the insurance carrier, not the company, invoked
certain conditions of its insurance contract to declare the
grievant ineligible for weekly disability income.

The foregoing

contract language, negotiated bilaterally by the parties expressly
subjects the granting of any of the group insurance benefits to
the provisions "required by the insurance carrier."

The denial

of weekly disability income was pursuant to and not violative of
that particular contract

limitation.

I cannot accept the Union's assertion that the provisions
or conditions which the insurance carrier may impose are limited
to those which were part of the insurance policy at the time the
collective bargaining agreement was negotiated. The foregoing
clause does not restrict itself to that period of time.

In my

judgement the possibility of limiting conditions and provisions
to those which existed when the contract was entered into, or to
foreclose any later changes in conditions of eligibility, were
well within the contemplation of the parties when the contract

-4was negotiated.

Had any such time limitation been intended,

the parties could and should have said so by contract language
in the foregoing clause.

That they did not means that they

accepted the possibility that the insurance carrier might make
certain changes in eligibility requirements and conditions during the contract term, to which the parties would be bound.
This is not to say that the carrier would be allowed to
make major or radical

changes which would actually or construc-

tively nullify any or all of the benefits.

That would be an

abuse of the limitations set forth in the last paragraph of
Article XXVIII.

But reasonable changes are clearly allowed and

are contemplated by contract language which is both contemporary
and prospective.

Therefore I cannot hold that the provision invoked

by the insurance carrier to deny the grievant weekly disability
income, even if legislated subsequent to the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement, was an abuse of the foregoing
contract language for which the Company must assume liability.
It should be clear that the Arbitrator makes no determination whatsoever as to whether the insurance carrier properly or
improperly denied the grievant's claim for weekly disability
income.

Rather, his decision is limited to the holding that the

carrier's denial of that claim was not a violation by the Company
of the collective bargaining agreement.

The grievant's rights,

if any, to pursue her claim directly against the insurance carrier
in whatever forum has jurisdiction, are expressly reserved.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The dispute is arbitrable.
The denial of weekly disability benefits
to Eva King by the Company's insurance
carrier was not a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September
1977
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of September, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 12330, AFL-CIO
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Allied Chemical Corporation,
Buffalo Dye Plant, Specialty
Chemicals Division

In accordance with Article IX of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 13, 1976 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the Union
grievance #77.1.3 dated December 10, 1976?
The hearing was held on August 9, 1977 in Buffalo, New York
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The Company filed a post-hearing brief.

Following extensive reductions in the work force, the
Company closed down the plant area in which the plant compactor
was located.

As a consequence the Company subcontracted the

pick xp and compacting of its trash, debris, etc. to the Niagara
Sanitation Company.

The bargaining unit truckdriver who prev-

iously performed this work was transferred to other assignments
without loss of pay.
The Union's grievance #77.1.3 reads:
Buffalo Specialty Dye is violating the subcontract with transportation by contracting
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work with an outside company to do transportation work while there are men on layoff that could be called back to do this work.
There were twenty-three Demster Boxes brought
in around the plant by Niagara Sanitation.
This work is done by the Transportation Department and since there are three men on layoff
from the Transportation Department the Buffalo
Specialty Dye Co. is going against the subcontract by contracting outside work. These
men on layoff should be called back to work.
This practice is unfair and unjust and should
be stopped by the Buffalo Specialty Dye Co.
The Company contends that with the close-down of the entire
area in which the compactor is located, the necessary utilities
to support the compactor were no longer operative or available;
the compactor was in poor condition; the Company's trucks were
not equipped with compactor equipment; and it was necessary therefore to subcontract the pick up, removal and compacting of trash,
and debris to an outside contractor whose trucks had compactor
equipment.
The Union contends that the Company's action violated
Article XII Section (6) of the contract entitled New Practices,
and also violated subcontracting agreements dated June 13, 1976.
Article XII Section (6) reads:
New Practices
(6) Any new practice pertaining to rates of
pay, hours of employment, and other conditions
of employment shall be brought to the attention
of the Bargaining Committee and when agreed upon, shall be promptly reduced to writing in a
form satisfactory to both the Company and the
Union.
The two subcontracting agreements dated June 13, 1976 read
respectively:

-3SUBCONTRACT - MAINTENANCE
The Company will not contract out any work
that has been performed by its employees, or
that could be performed by available qualified
employees, provided such work can be performed
in an economic efficient, and timely manner
and for which adequate tools and equipment are
then available within the plant.
Further, the Company will notify and advise,
and upon request, will discuss details of the
subcontracting with the local Union before
contracting out any work.
No maintenance employee in the affected trades
will lose any time from his basic work week
(40 hours) as a direct result of subcontracting.
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
In a discussion with the Union concerning prior
"Notice and Advice" pertaining to the sub-contracting agreement, the Company agrees to:
1. Provide a 3-day advance notice for subcontracts not considered an emergency or detrimental to total plant operation.
2. If it is essential to sub-contract with less
than 3 days' notice, the Company will contact a
member of the Union Committee or their designated
representative in the most expedient manner.
3. Further, the Company will not rely totally
on interoffice mail as a means of notification.
4. All sub-contracts will be processed thru the
Employee Relations Department prior to release to
the approved contractor.
The Union asserts that the use of a subcontractor and the
elimination of the duties of the bargaining unit truck driver with
regard to removing compacted debris, trash, etc., is a "new
practice" pertaining to a condition of employment within the meaning of Article XII Section (6); that it was not brought to the
attention of the Union, not agreed upon, and not reduced to writin

-4satisfactory to both sides.
With regard to the subcontracting

agreements it is the

Union's claim that the Company failed to give any notice to the
Union in advance of its agreement with Niagara Sanitation and
that the work contracted out had been performed by bargaining
unit employees and could be continued on that basis within the
provisions of the first paragraph of the first above quoted subcontracting agreement.
I am not persuaded that Article XII Section (6) is applicable to the instant set of facts.

In my judgement that contract

clause relates to changes in express provisions of the contract
or to any practice concerning a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining on which the parties must jointly negotiate.

It is

a contractual recitation of the basic legal requirement that
wages, hours and other conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining may not be unilaterally promulgated,
introduced or changed by the employer; but rather must be meaningfully negotiated by the union and employer.

In the instant

case we are not dealing with a new practice, change in or the
introduction of conditions of employment not covered by the contract or on which the parties have not engaged in meaningful
collective bargaining.

The instant case deals with the matter

of subcontracting on which the parties did bargain because they
entered into two subcontracting agreements dated June 13, 1976,
the same date as the collective bargaining agreement, and which

-5update original subcontracting agreements of June 13, 1973 and
January 23, 1974.

As I see it this is not a case of a "new

practice" but rather is a case involving the application and
interpretation of "two side agreements" which have the same
force and effect as a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Therefore the question narrows to whether the Company's
action violated the two subcontracting agreements.

I cannot

conclude that it did.
The burden is on the Union to prove its grievance.

The

Company asserts that the subcontracting agreements are not
applicable to the Transportation Department, and hence have no
bearing on the instant subcontracting.

The Union's case fails

simply because it has not clarified the intent and applicability
of those subcontracting agreements, which, based on a bare
reading, are and remain ambiguous.
The basic subcontracting agreement recited first above
has as its subject SUBCONTRACT-MAINTENANCE.

That heading, to-

gether with the text of that agreement leaves unclear whether it
applies to subcontracting generally or only to subcontracting
in the Maintenance Department.
either way with equal logic.

In my opinion it can be read
Its heading, which includes the

word "Maintenance", together with its last paragraph, which
specifically refers to maintenance employee(s) could mean that
the entire agreement applies only to the subcontracting of maintenance work or work performed by the "affected trades."

On the
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other hand the first two paragraphs talk about subcontracting
generally, thereby allowing for the interpretation that the first
two paragraphs apply to the subcontracting of any work performed
by the bargaining unit, with the third paragraph applicable only
to the affected trades.

The second subcontracting memorandum

of agreement is obviously inextricably related to the first,
and deals only with the manner in which the Company will give
advance notice to the Union, apparently in amplification of the
second paragraph of the first agreement.

So the second agree-

ment in no way clarifies the ambiguity of the first.

More

importantly, the record before me does not clear up the ambiguity.
If the agreement applies, I would have no difficulty in
holding that the Company failed to give the Union the requisite
three day advance notice, whether or not the bargaining unit
could continue to do such work in "an economic efficient and
timely manner for which adequate tools and equipments are then
available within the plant."

On the other hand if the agreement

is not applicable to the Transportation Department, the Company
would have no obligation to provide the Union with advance
notice and it would be immaterial if the bargaining unit employees
could perform the work efficiently.

Also, if the agreements do

not apply to the Transportation Department, it means that
though the parties bargained on the question of subcontracting,
and could have negotiated a clear and explicit provision restricting or conditioning all subcontracting

in all of the Company's
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departments, the parties did not do so.

And hence in that circum

stance, though it was well within their contemplation, no other
contract restriction was placed on the Company's right to subcontract .
The Union has failed to meet its burden of showing the
applicability of the subcontracting agreement to the Transportation Department.

No examples were introduced into evidence of

the application of the subcontracting agreement to the work performed by

departments other than the Maintenance Department!,

No evidence was adduced as to what the parties intended or what
they said to each other when the subcontracting agreements were
negotiated.

In short the record is inadequate to conclude that

the subcontracting agreements went beyond the Maintenance Department and covered work performed by bargaining unit employees else
where.

This is not to say that the agreements apply only to the

Maintenance Department.

Rather it is to say that the agreements

are ambiguously written and the ambiguity has not been clarified
in this record; leaving those agreements undefined and unclear
as to scope and intent and therefore subject to either interpretation.

On that basis the Union has failed to sustain its

grievance, though the rights of the parties are reserved in
subsequent cases to adduce the requisite clarifying evidence.
Accordingly, having found Article XII Section (6) inapplicable and because, based on the record before me I am unable to
determine whether the subcontracting agreements are limited to th
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Maintenance Department or apply to the subcontracting work of
the bargaining unit generally, including the work of the
Transportation Department, I cannot find support in the record
to uphold the Union's grievance.

Therefore the grievance is

denied.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance #77.1.3 dated
December 10, 1976 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 3, 1977
STATE OF New York )o o
COUNTY OF New York )

•

On this third day of October, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Committee of Interns and Residents

and
The League of Voluntary Hospitals on
Behalf of: Maimonides Medical Center;
Mount Sinai Hospital; Kingsbrook
Jewish Medical Center; New York
University Medical Center; Long Island
Jewish-Hillside Medical Center;
Montefiore Hospital & Medical Center;
New York Medical College; Catholic
Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens ;
Hospital_

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1875 76

In accordance with Article XV of the collective bargaining
agreement dated 1974-1976 between the Committee of Interns and
Residents hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and The League
of Voluntary Hospitals on behalf of the above named hospitals,
hereinafter referred to as "The League" or "The Hospitals", the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Did the above named Hospitals violate Article
111 Paragraph 6(a) of the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to pay COLA there
provided, to house staff who came on the payroll effective on and after July 1, 1976? If
so what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association in New York City on March 14, 1977 at which time
representatives of the Union and League appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

-2Though I agree with the Union's interpretation of the relevant
contract clause, I consider conclusive the conceded fact that
during contract negotiations between the Union and the League,
the chief negotiator for the League agreed that the League and
the hospitals it represented would do the same as did the City of
New York in the contract between the Union and the Health and
Hospital Corporation with regard to the application of COLA to
house staff who came on the payroll on and after July 1, 1976.
In his direct testimony in this arbitration, William Abelow,
Esq. the Director and chief negotiator for the League stated:
There is no question that early in January
the League made an offer to include in the
contract COLA language in line with what
was being done with the City (Tr. page 153).
On cross examination Mr. Abelow was asked by counsel for the
League:
Q. The understanding was that there would
be the same treatment under COLA with
the League as there was with the City.
Was that the understanding between the
parties ?
Mr. Abelow replied:
A. At the time we signed the contract.
(Tr. page 61).

Yes.

It is undisputed that on June 18, 1975, by letter from Mr.
Robert Pick, the City's Assistant Director of Labor Relations,
the City informed the Union that COLA would be paid to house
staff who came on the payroll effective on and after July 1, 1976
Six days later the contract between the Union and the League was
executed.

-3The position of the League is that it did not know of the
City's decision to grant COLA to house staff who came on the
payroll on or after July 1, 1976, nor did it learn of Mr. Pick's
letter until the instant arbitration.

I consider this only an

explanation of why the League and the Hospitals did not grant
COLA payments to the grievants in this case, but not a defense
to the promise to do so.
Having committed itself to the same substantive arrangement
agreed to between the Union and the Health and Hospital
Corporation (the latter represented by the City of New York),
that commitment

obtains regardless of whether and when the

League or the Hospitals

learned of the agreement between the

City and the Union under the CIR-Health and Hospital Corporation
contract.
Indeed, the question of whether and when the League or the
Hospitals learned or should have known of how the City would
implement the COLA provisions under the agreement between the
Union and the Health and Hospital Corporation is relevant only
to the Union's request that this Arbitrator award COLA with
interest to house staff who came on the payroll effective on or
after July 1, 1976 and that the costs of this arbitration be
assessed wholly against the League or the Hospitals.
I consider the relevant dates significant.

If as of June 24

1975, when the instant contract was executed, the League or the
Hospitals did not know that the City six days earlier had agreed

-4with the Union to apply COLA in the manner sought by the Union
in tbiis proceeding, I am satisfied that they should have learned
of the City's decision

within the more than one year which

elapsed between the date that the contract was signed and July
1, 1976, when, for the first time, the question of the application of COLA to house staff employed on and after that latter
date, arose.

The League representative acknowledged that at

the time the contract was signed on June 24, 1975, he knew that
the City would determine how COLA would be applied under the
CIR-Health and Hospitals Corporation contract and that Mr. Pick
was to write a letter to the Union setting forth the City's
decision.

The League's knowledge that such a letter was to be

written, served as notice not only that a City decision was
made or would be made shortly but created an obvious duty on the
part of the League or the Hospitals to find oi± between June 24,
1975 and July 1, 1976 what understanding had been reached between
the City and the Union, so that the commitment made to the Union
during contract negotiations c'ould be implemented.
As I have concluded that the League and the Hospitals should
have known at least by July 1, 1976 that the City had agreed
with the Union to grant COLA to house staff employed on or after
July 1, 1976, I must also conclude that there should have been
no need for the Union to bring on this arbitration to enforce
that commitment.

Under that circumstance I deem the Union's
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request for interest on the monies due appropriate and proper,
However, for various reasons I deny the Union's request for
the assessment of the costs of this arbitration against the
League and the Hospitals.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations

of the above named parties makes the following

AWARD:
The captioned Hospitals violated Section
III Paragraph 6(a) of the collective
bargaining agreement by refusing to pay
COLA therein provided, to house staff
who came on the payroll effective on and
after July 1, 1976. The Hospitals are
directed to make said COLA payments together
with interest at the statutory rate retroactive to July 1, 1976.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 27, 1977
STATE OF New York )
Qq .
' oo •
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this twenty seventh day of June, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Livingston Manor Faculty Association

AWARD
Case #1339 0079 77

and
Livingston Manor Central School District,
Board of Education

The above matter was settled by and between the above
named parties by direct negotiations, and accepted by the
grievant, Penelope Wagner.
At the request of the parties I make the settlement
stipulation my AWARD, as follows:
1. Penelope Wagner shall be reinstated by the
Board as a probationary teacher to a position
in her former tenure area for three (3) consecutive semesters beginning in the fall semester
in September, 1977 and ending at the conclusion
of the fall semester in January, 1979.
2. During the foregoing period Mrs. Wagner shall
be observed and evaluated in accordant e with
Article 8 of the 75-77 Collective Bargaining Agreement .
3. The Board shall notify Mrs. Wagner of their
decision to grant or deny tenure no later than
December 1, 1978. In the event that she is not
so notified she will continue in employment with
tenure.
4. Penelope Wagner shall be entitled to participate
in the New York State Health Insurance Program beginning on the 1st day of June, 1977 or as soon as
legally possible at the Board's cost.

-25. In September, 1977, Penelope Wagner shall be
placed on Step 4 of the salary schedule then in
effect.
6. Effective the first full pay period of the
second
semester Penelope Wagner shall be placed
on Step 5 of the salary schedule then in effect
and shall remain for the balance of her probationary
period.
7. This settlement shall not be interpreted to
prejudice the positions of either party with respect
to and in any subsequent matter nor shall it serve
as precedent to the interpretation or construction
of any agreement between the parties.
8. Eric J. Schmertz shall retain jurisdiction with
respect to the compliance and implementation of this
Award.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 8, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
On this eighth day of August, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknolwedged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York Stereotypers' Union No. 1
New York Printing Pressmen's Union
No. 2

AWARD
Case #1330 0479 77

and
The Long Island Press, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators under
the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreements between the above named parties and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of said parties make the following AWARD:
1_ There is no obligation under Section 11
of the Pressman's contract and Minute
Item Section 21(a) of the Stereotypers1
contract for the Company to make payment
to the affected employees in lieu of notice of the permanent suspension of operations on March 25, 1977.
2_ Under Section 25 of the Pressman's contract and Section 10 of the Stereotypers'
contract contributions to the respective
pension and welfare funds are not required to be made on the entire amounts of
severance pay and notice pay.
A Jury duty and compassionate leave benefits
as set forth in Section 11 of the Stereotypers 1 contract are not effective from
the close of operations March 25, 1977
through December 31, 1977.
B_ Walter Dermody, Jr., Thomas W. Jones and
Henry E. Frohnhoefer qualify for severance
pay under Section 33 of the contract.

-2I_ Robert Kronert and Charles Mundhenk are
not entitled to severance pay under the
contract.
II The claims of Thomas Jablonsky and Edward
Gursky for severance pay are barred by the
time limits of Section 41(a) of the contract,

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Irving Newhouse
Concurring in 1,
2, A, I and II.
Dissenting from B

Jack Kennedy
Dissenting from 1,
2, A.Concurring in
B

William Kennedy
Dissenting from 1,
2, I and II
DATED: January 16, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixteenth day of January, 1977, before me person'
ally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: January
1977
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of January, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Irving Newhouse to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED: January
1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )S°"'
On this
day of January, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Jack Kennedy to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: January
1977
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
On this
day of January, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared William Kennedy to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York Stereotypers' Union No. 1
New York Printing Pressmen's Union
No. 2

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 0479 77

and
The Long Island Press, Inc.

In accordance with the applicable arbitration provisions
of the respective collective bargaining agreements between the
Long Island Press, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as the
"Publisher" or the "Company"), and the New York Printing Pressmen's Union Number Two and the New York Stereortypers' Union
Number One (hereinafter referred to separately as the "Pressmen's
Union" and the"Stereotypers' Union" and collectively as the
"Unions"), the Undersigned was selected as Chairman of a Board
of Arbitration to hear and decide, together with the Unions' and
Publisher's designees to said Board, certain issues in dispute
between said parties arising out of the closing of the Publisher
operations on March 25, 1977.

Mr. Irving Newhouse served as the

Publisher's designee on the Board of Arbitration for all issues
involved.

Messrs. William Kennedy and Jack Kennedy served

respectively as the Pressmen's Union and Stereotypers' Union
designees to said Board for those issues between their Union and
the Publisher.

A hearing was held on August 10, 1977 at which

time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
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afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
the hearing was taken.
hearing briefs.

A stenographic record of

The Unions and the Publisher filed post-

A meeting of the Board of Arbitration was

expressly waived as was the Oath of the Arbitrators.
Six issues have been submitted for determination; two
of which are common to both Unions and the Publisher; two of
which are between the Stereotypers' Union and the Publisher;
and two of which are between the Pressmen's Union and the
Publisher.
The two common stipulated issues are:
!_ Whether there is an obligation under
Section 11 of the Pressmen's contract
and Minute Item Section 21(a) of the
Stereotypers' contract for the Company
to make payment to the affected employees
in lieu of notice of the permanent suspension of operations on March 25, 1977?
2_ Whether contributions to the respective
pension and welfare funds under Section
25 of the Pressmen's contract and Section
10 of the Stereotypers' contract should
be made on the entire amounts of severance
and notice pay?
The issues between the Stereotypers' Union and the
Publisher are stipulated as:
A Whether jury duty and compassionate leave
benefits as set forth in Section 11 of the
Stereotypers' contract should be effective
from the date of the closing of operations
on March 25, 1977, through December 31,
1977?
B_ Whether certain enumerated individuals qualified for severance pay under Section 33 of
the contract?
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The stipulated issues between the Pressmen's Union and
the Publisher are:
I_ Whether Robert Kronert and Charles
Mundhenk are entitled to severance
pay under the contract?
II Whether Thomas Jablonsky and Edward
Gursky are entitled to severance pay
under the contract?
In the course of the hearing the Unions asserted that
at issue also was the Publisher's failure to pay severance pay
undisputedly due most of the employee's covered by both contracts
The Unions sought an order directing forthwith payment of said
severance pay with interest.

The Publisher acknowledged his

obligation to pay the severance benefits, but took the position
that this was not an issue properly before this Board of
Arbitration and that the Board did not have jurisdiction to
rule on that question.

At the conclusion of the hearing, follow-

ing discussions between the parties and the Chairman, the
Publisher agreed to make immediate payment to those employees
undisputedly entitled to severance pay, and the Union withdrew
its demand for interest.

Accordingly that issue has been re-

solved .
Common Issue 1
I conclude that the two relevant contract sections,
namely Section 11 of the Pressmen's contract and Minute Item
21(a) of the Stereotypers' contract apply to layoffs, reduced
operations causing layoffs, and operational changes causing

-4layoffs under circumstances where the Publisher otherwise continues in business and continues publishing his newspaper.

In

my judgement neither Section was intended to be applicable to
the instant circumstances - the complete shutdown and cessation
of the Publisher's business.

Rather,, in the event of the total

closing down of the Publisher's operations and the permanent
termination of the publication of his newspaper, notice pay is
preempted by the severance pay provisions of both contracts.

I

am satisfied that this conclusion is supported not only by a
logical reading and interpretation of the two contract sections
involved but also by other arbitration decisions which I consider
to be relevant and in point.

Accordingly the Unions' grievance

for pay in lieu of notice when the Publisher totally ceased
business on March 25, 1977, is denied.

I make no determination

on whether the Publisher met his statutory obligations under the
National Labor Relations Act, as Amended.

Any such question is

not within the jurisdiction of this Arbitrator but rather is a
matter for other forums.

In that respect the rights of all

parties concerned are expressly reserved.
Common Issue 2
Based on the foregoing determination, the Unions' request
for the payment contributions to the respective pension and welfare funds on notice pay is mooted, and hence denied.
I am not persauded that severance pay is synonymous with
pay for "a shift worked" or "a shift paid for" within the meaning

-5of Section 25(c) of the Pressmen's contract, or "pay per shift
worked" within the meaning of Section 25(b) of the Pressmen's
contract.

Similarly I am not persuaded that severance pay con-

stitutes pay for a "shift worked or paid for" within the meaning
of Section 10(d) of the Stereotypers' contract.

Clearly, no

specific shifts were in fact worked for which the severance pay
was paid.

On the contrary, the severance pay was a lump sum

and it became due and payable upon severance from employment,
not for specific time worked.

In my view the Union's reliance

on the language "or paid for" as a substitute for alternative
to "shift worked" is misplaced.

That phrase must be read to-

gether with the balance of Sections 25(b) of the Pressmen's
contract and Section lOld) of the Stereotypers' contract which
provide in significant part that "such payments will be made on
the basis of weekly employment....(emphasis added).

Absent more

explicit language and a special definition of severance pay, I
do not interpret severance pay as the equivalent of pay for ongoing "weekly employment."

Again, it is a benefit, accummulated

as a consequence of years of past service, payable on the termination of the employment, not as a consequence of or related to
current or prospective weekly employment.
I do not read Section 33 of the Stereotypers' contract
to bring severance pay within the meaning of "shift....paid for."
As I see it the reference to "eight weeks pay (forty (40)

shifts)"

does not mean that severance pay is to be treated as pay for forty

-6shifts worked.

Rather, in my judgement, the parenthetical

reference to "forty (40)

shifts" is used only as a measurement

of the amount of severance pay, not for what the severance represents or for what it is in payment.
Accordingly the Unions' request that contribution^ to
the respective welfare and pension funds be made for severance
pay is denied.
Stereotypers' Issue A
I do not find that Sections ll(a), and (b)(i) survived
the cessation of operations on March 25, 1977.

The Union asserts

that those employees who worked the more than 109 shifts referrec
to in Section ll(c) acquired a vested interest, extending to the
original contract termination date of December 31, 1977, for
bereavement leave and jury service, and that the Publisher shoulc
be required to set up an escrow fund to take care of such claims
for the full contract term.
As I see it the completion of more than 109 shifts is not
the only requirement for entitlement to bereavement leave and
jury duty pay.

I read Sections ll(a) and (b) to be founded on

the precondition that a regular situation holder who seeks bereavement leave or jurty duty pay must be actively employed by
the Publisher at the time the claim arises.

Section

ll(a)

applies to a regular situation holder "covered by this agreement.
With the cessation of operations and with the termination of the
Publisher's employees as a consequence (and possibly their

-7employment elsewhere), I consider it highly questionable, both
under the language of the contract and as a matter of general
contract law, that any such employee remained "covered by this
agreement" subsequent to the cessation of the Publisher's
operations.

More pointed is the fact that Section ll(a) accords

a benefit of "three days off with pay."

Obviously this pre-

supposes employment at the time that a bereavement leave is
requested, otherwise from what would an employee get "three days
off"?

With the cessation of the newspaper on and after March

25, 1977 there is no way that a regular situation holder could
be given "days off with pay",

for there are no

days at which

he would be at work.
Similarly Section ll(b) defines jury service as a day
on which the regular situation holder is required to report as
a juror "when he normally would have been scheduled work work..
...."

On and after March 25, 1977 there are no days on which

any of the employees would be "scheduled to work."

In short I

am persuaded that the bereavement and jury duty benefits are
founded upon an implicit if not explicit condition that employment be ongoing at the time that an employee seeks either or
both benefits; and inasmuch as there was no ongoing employment
after March 25, 1977, the right to those benefits on and after
that date, even for those who had worked the prescribed 109
shifts, did not survive that date.
in this regard is denied.

Accordingly the Union grievance

-8Stereotypers' Issue B
There are three grievants involved in this issue, Walter
Dermody, Jr., Thomas W. Jones and Henry E. Frohnhoefer.

Tech-

nically they were classified as "substitutes" at the time that
the Publisher ceased operations, having lost their

regular

situation" status about three years earlier due to reductions
in the Publisher's work force.

I conclude that this issue calls

for an equitable rather than technical resolution.

Though the

grievants were not "regular situation holders", they had long
years of service with the Publisher, worked regularly on a five
day a week basis and accummulated each year a quantity of regular
straight time shifts equal to the amount worked by classified
regular situation holders.

After their reclassifications from

regular situation holders to substitutes, they continued their
employment with the Publisher uninterruptedly, and as before,
performed the same or virtually the same duties on a continuing
basis until the newspaper closed.

It has been stated that a

thing may not be within the technical letter of the law but yet
be within its spirit and intent.

Here, as to spirit and intent,

I believe that the three grievants performed

duties on a regu-

lar and continuing basis which, de facto, were identical to or
virtually the same as a regular situation holder.

Considering

that fact, together with their longevity with the Publisher and
the abrupt cessation of the publication of the newspaper without
prior notice to the Union or the employees, I shall deem that

-9under these particular and unique circumstances the grievants
are eligible for severance pay under Section 33 of the contract.
Pressmen's Issue I
I cannot conclude that the grievants, Messrs. Kronert
and Mundhenk were "deprived of their work" by the shutdown of
the newspaper.

Both grievants were not actively employed at the

time of the shutdown because they were either ill or disabled
and had been out of work for those reasons for some time.

There

is no evidence to show that either or both were physically
capable of returning to work at the time of the shutdown or
significantly, were or would be physically capable of returning
to work at any time during the life of the contract had the
shutdown not taken place.

Indeed, based on their disabilities

and conditions, and the extent of time that they had been away
from active employment, I think it probable that they would not
have been capable of returning to work at any time during the
life of the contract, and I think it clear that they were not
capable of doing so when the newspaper ceased operations on
March 25, 1977.

Under those circumstances it is accurate to

state that they were not at work and could not work not because
of the shutdown, but rather because of their illnesses and disabilities.

I distinguish the decision of Arbitrator Jesse Simons

quoted in the Union's brief, from the facts in this case.

Mr.

Simons stated inter alia in a case between the Publisher and a
different union that the permanent shutdown of The Press precluded those who were ill

or disabled from returning to work
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when they became well, and because they could not therefore
exercise their priority claims they had been deprived of future
employment by the shutdown and were entitled to severance pay.
Here however, grievant Kronert was not simply ill or disabled
within the Simons decision, but had been deemed totally disabled
from open heart surgery, was receiving total disability benefits
from Social Security and had not worked in the industry for
several years.

I think it fair to conclude that he would not

have become physically capable of returning to work any time
during the life of the contract even if The Press had not shut
down.

As to Mundhenk it appears that he had not sought work

for over a year prior to the date of the cessation of operations!
nor had he sought employment in the industry as of the date of
the arbitration hearing.

Under that circumstance, even within

the Simons decision, I believe he and/or the Union on his behalf
had the burden of showing, not merely alleging, that he would
have been capable of returning to work sometime during the life
of the contract.

That burden was not met.

Accordingly this

grievance is denied.
Pressmen's Issue II
Irrespective of the merits of this issue, the remedy
which the Union seeks, namely restoration of the grievants to the
mutually agreed to priority list and the payment to them of
severance pay, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board of
Arbitration.

The Union's case is based on an allegation that

-li-

the Publisher breached the contract in failing to recall the
grievants to work in accordance with their recall rights under
the contract.

The Union asserts that had this breach not

occurred the grievants would have been on the mutually agreed
to priority list at the time of the shutdown and hence eligible
for severance pay.

However the issue of the alleged contract

breach was not raised when the grievants allegedly should have
been recalled to work but rather only after the cessation of
operations.

Section 41(a)

of the contract, as the Publisher

points out, bars the Board of Arbitration from issuing a decisiqn
the effect of which is "retroactive to a date earlier than the
date on which the issue is raised...."

This clear and explicit

limitation, negotiated by the parties as part of their contract
cannot be ignored by the Arbitrators, for to do so would, by
the very language of Section 41(a)

prejudice the final and

binding nature of the Arbitrator's decision.

To grant the

relief which the Union seeks would be to restore the grievants
to the mutually agreed upon priority list on a date substantially
earlier than the date on which the issue of their recall was
raised.

On that basis, an analysis of this issue on the merits

is mooted and the grievance must therefore be denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In The Matter of The Arbitration
of the claims of Leila Mustachi,
Christine Grove, Julie Small and
Carol Weitz
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
and Macmillan Book Clubs

Appearances:
For the Claimants Attorney General of the State of New York
by: Arnold D. Fleischer, Esq.
For the Respondent Company Linden & Deutsch
by: David Blasband, Esq.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler
by: Frederick H. Bullen, Esq.
These matters came to arbitration in accordance with an
Agreement of Conciliation dated March 27, 1976 between the
Attorney General of the State of New York, hereinafter referred
to as "the Attorney General" and Macmillan, Inc., Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc. and Macmillan Book Clubs, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as the "Company."

The Agreement was approved and

ordered by the State Division of Human Rights in an Order After
Stipulation dated March 30, 1976.
The pertinent part of said Order reads:
Any employee who was employed as of September
5, 1974, the date of the Attorney General's complaint before the State Division of Human Rights
and who believes he or she is entitled to retroactive pay because of prior discrimination based
upon sex, race or national origin in terms and
conditions of employment, shall present within
30 days from the date hereof a claim, in writing,
to the Attorney General setting forth in detail
the exact nature of the complaint in a manner to
be specified by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General shall transmit to respondents within 20

-2days thereafter the name of each such employee
who submits a claim which meets his criteria
for arbitrability. Such employee (hereinafter
referred to as a "claimant"), shall be entitled
to have his or her claim determined under the
following procedure and conditions.
In determining whether an employee's claim
should be transmitted to respondents, it is understood that the Attorney General will require
specific and detailed information concerning the
nature of the alleged discriminatory practices
and,j,that he will transmit to respondents an
employee's complaint only if, in his opinion,
it is a bona fide complaint and raises a reasonable question as to whether a discriminatory
practice existed in respect to that employee which
warrants a hearing to determine such question.
The decision of the Attorney General to transmit
such a claim to respondents should in no way be
considered a judgement or evidence as to the
ultimate validity of such claim.
The Attorney General and respondents shall
select and jointly agree upon, within 30 days
from the effective date of this Agreement, an
individual who shall serve as arbitrator to
determine any such retroactive claims. The
services of such arbitrator shall be paid for
by the respondents. The hearing before the
arbitrator shall begin approximately 60 days
after the transmittal to respondents by the
Attorney General of all claims as set forth
above. The arbitration shall be conducted under
the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Each claimant
shall have the right to utilize this arbitration
procedure and, if he or she so desires, to be
represented by counsel in such procedure upon
signing a statement agreeing that this procedure
will be the sole procedure through which all such
claims will be processed and waiving any further
action before the State Division of Human Rights,
the EEOC, the Federal District Court, or any other
forum concerning such claims and releasing respondents from any and all claims and liability in
respect to any discriminatory practices except for
any amount that may be awarded pursuant to the
arbitration provided for herein. The claimant,
along with respondents, will also agree in writing

-3to accept the written report and award of
the arbitrator with respect to the issues
set forth below as final and binding upon
them. Each claim shall be heard and determined on an individual basis. The burden
of proof shall be on the claimant.
The sole issues for the arbitrator to hear
and determine with respect to each claimant
are:
(i) Whether during the period from September
5,-1974 to October 1, 1975 (or if such claimant is one of the 44 persons named in the caption of the Attorney General's complaint of
September 5, 1974, whether during the period
from September 5, 1973 to October 1, 1975),
respondents discriminated as to such claimant
on the basis of sex, race or national origin
by paying a salary to the claimant at a rate
less than the rate respondents paid to an
employee or employees of the opposite sex or
of a different race or national origin, for
equal work in a position, the performance of
which required equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which was performed under similar
working conditions, except where the differential
in salaries was made on the basis of seniority,
merit, quantity or quality of production, or any
other job related factor other than sex, race or
national origin;
(ii) In the event of a finding of discrimination
under the criteria set forth in paragraph (i)
above, the amount of retroactive pay to be awarded
with respect to the above time period. Such award
shall be based upon and shall not exceed the amount
of salary differential which was due to such salary
discrimination for the period during which such
actual discriminatory differential existed and
in no event for a period in excess of one year.
No penalties, costs or attorneys' fees shall be
awarded, and the arbitrator's findings and conclusions shall be limited to the aforesaid time
period.
Should the arbitrator find that a discriminatory salary differential was in existence during
the applicable periods set forth above for which
a corrective adjustment has not been made as of

-4the date of the hearing and which continues
to exist as to that claimant, respondents
agree, in addition to making whatever corrective
adjustment is awarded by the arbitrator pursuant
to paragraphs (i) and (ii) above, to make such
corrective adjustments effective prospectively
as of the date of the award.
The above named individuals, hereinafter referred to by
name or as the claimant(s), filed their claims for arbitration
in accordance with the foregoing Order and were represented in
this proceeding by the Attorney General.
Hearings were held on September 27th, September 29th,
October 18th and October 20th, 1976.
when her case was presented.

Each claimant was present

Representatives of the Attorney

General and the Company appeared at each of the hearings in
active representative capacities.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
ly waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was express-

The Company filed a post-hearing brief.

The Attorney

General waived submission of a reply-brief.
Submitted to the Undersigned as the Arbitrator duly
selected in accordance with the foregoing Order, were the follow
ing stipulated issues:
1. Whether during the period from September
5, 1973 to April 8, 1974 the Company discriminated as to Leila Mustachi on the basis of
sex by paying a salary to Leila Mustachi at a
rate less than the rate the Company paid to an
employee or employees of the opposite sex for
equal work in a position, the performance of
which required equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which was performed under similar
working conditions, except where the differential in salary was made on the basis of seniority,

-5merit, quantity or quality of production,
or any other job related factor other than
sex.
2.

Whether during the period from October
1973 to August, 1974 the Company discriminated as to Christine Grove on the basis
of sex by paying a salary to Christine Grove
at a rate less than the rate the Company paid
to an employee or employees of the opposite
sex for equal work in a position, the performance of which required equal skill, effort and
responsibility, and which was performed under
similar working conditions, except where the
differential in salary was made on the basis
of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of
production, or any other job related factor
other than sex.
3. Whether during the period from January 1974
to October 1974 the Company discriminated as to
Julie Small on the basis of sex by paying a
salary to Julie Small at a rate less than the rate
the Company paid to an employee or employees of
the opposite sex for equal work in a position,
the performance of which required equal skill,
effort and responsibility, and which was performed under similar working conditions, except where
the differential in salary was made on the basis
of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of
production, or any other job related factor
other than sex.
4. Whether during the period from February
1974 to July 1974 and April 1974 to August 1974
the Company discriminated as to Carol Weitz on
the basis of sex by paying a salary to Carol
Weitz at a rate less than the rate the Company
paid to an employee or employees of the opposite
sex for equal work in a position, the performance
of which required equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which was performed under similar
working conditions, except where the differential
in salary was made on the basis of seniority,
merit, quantity or quality of production, or any
other job related factor other than sex.

-6There is no evidence of and indeed no claim that the
Company engaged in overt or undisguised sex discrimination with
regard to the salaries of the claimants.

Rather, each claimant

compares herself with a male employee whom it is alleged performed the same or similar work, or work of no greater responsibility or importance, but who was paid more.

One claimant

additionally claims that she took on the higher rated duties of
a superior who had resigned and who was male, without additional
compensation.

From these comparisons the arbitrator is asked to

infer and conclude that because the claimants are women they
were paid less and/or not accorded extra compensation for
additional services.
I have no doubt that each claimant feels intensely that
she was paid less solely because of her sex and that this
constitutes sex discrimination within the meaning of the law.
Sex discrimination is a serious charge.

As such, in an

adversary, ajudicatory forum, whether in arbitration, before
an administrative agency or in the courts, the burden of proof
is on the complainant, and the allegation of sex discrimination
must be proved by the standard applicable to civil matters,
namely by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, if not
by substantial evidence.
It is well settled, by decisions of Human Rights
Commissions, the EEOC, and the courts, that differences in pay
between men and women may be lawfully justified by significant
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differences between them in such things as experience, seniority, job performance, responsibility, importance of their
duties and the scope, complexity, quality and quantity of their
respective work assignments.

More in point, the wording of the

issue in the instant proceedings, as set forth in the foregoing Order, recognizes the legitimacy of differentials in
salaries "made on the basis of seniority, merit, quantity or
quality of production, or any other job related factor other
than sex."
With the burden of proof as stated, the claimants herein must show that their lower salaries were not due to any of
the foregoing accepted conditions.

Put another way, I would

be compelled to draw and reach the inferences and conclusions
requested by the claimants only if the total record failed to
show a preponderance of legitimate, reasonable and acceptable
differences between the claimants and the male employees to
whom they compare themselves, which would explain and justify
the salary differentials.
In the instant cases I am satisfied that one or more
of those recognized circumstances constituted the basis for
paying the male employee to whom each claimant compares herself more than the claimant.

Consequently, based on those

generally accepted conditions which allow distinctions in pay,
and more specifically on the accepted exceptions set forth in
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the stipulated issues, the claims of sex discrimination by
each of the claimants herein must be denied as failing to meet
the requisite standard of proof.
At this point however, I choose to state certain conclusions which I have reached based on the record before me,
though as indicated I do not find they involve sex discrimination.

The first is that the salaries paid the claimants for

the duties and responsibilities of their respective jobs were,
in my judgement, low, but this was true of male employees
similarly situated.

Also, with regard to one of the claimants,

the Company, in my judgement, unfairly added to her duties
without increasing her pay when her superior resigned, and the
Company unfairly failed to raise her pay when it subsequently
hired a male employee at a higher salary in a position lateral
to that of that claimant.

Why these situations did not con-

stitute sex discrimination shall be discussed more fully below.
However, I do take as "judicial notice" the payments the
Company made outside of and subsequent to the instant arbitration hearing to claimants Grove and Weitz which I believe were
designed in part at least to redress those situations.

Those

payments were expressly made by the Company and accepted by
those claimants without bearing on or prejudice to the respective positions of the Company and those claimants in this
arbitration.

-9Leila Mustachi
During the relevant period the claimant was a Bookclub Director.
$13,500.

She was hired in October 1972 at a salary of

Her salary was increased to $14,580 on November 1,

1973; to $16,138 in July 1974 and $17,320 in July

1975.

She compares herself with Lawrence Apple who was hired
in January 1972 as a Book-Club Director at a salary of $15,000.
In January 1973 he was promoted to Associate Editorial Director
at a salary of $17,200.
on January

1, 1974.

His salary was increased to $18,630

In April 1974 he was promoted to Director

of New Product Development and was increased in salary to
$21,000.
I find significant differences between the claimant
and Apple.which justify the salary differential during the
entire relevant period.

Those differences are based on the

factors of experience at time of hire, seniority, importance
of job assignments, and scope of duties and responsibilities.
Apple was hired some nine months before the claimant.
He came to the Company with specific prior experience in
directing a book club for one of the Company's competitors.
The claimant had no prior experience in that work.

On the

basis of prior experience in directing a book club, I find
that the Company was justified in paying Apple $1,500 a year
more than the claimant at the point that both were hired, and
that the initial salary difference was for that reason.

-10Thereafter, it should be noted, that Apple, who enjoyed
nine months greater job tenure than the claimant came up in the
normal routine for salary evaluation and salary increases ahead
of the claimant, and so on seniority alone would continue to
enjoy a wage differential as compared with the claimant, assuming both received the same periodic increases at specified times
of review.
More significant to my mind is that Apple was twice
promoted, first to the job of Associate Editorial Director and
then to Director of New Products Development while the claimant
remained as a Book-Club Director.

Those promotions, with the

higher titles, create a presumption that Apple assumed additional
duties and responsibilities beyond that of a Book-Club Director.
The claimant asserts that those promotions were "paper
promotions" without additional duties and therefore are of no
consequence to the comparison she makes.
The weight of the probative evidence does not support
the claimant's assertion, and the presumption not only remains
unrebutted but is reinforced.

I accept the direct testimony

and the subsequent affidavit of the Company's President as better
evidence than the bare affidavit of Francine Campbell, and conclude that Apple did assume and perform additional and important
duties as a member of the New Products Committee while he was an
Associate Editorial Director and later when he was made Director
of New Products.

-11Additionally, I find that Apple, while an Associate
Editorial Director assumed greater training and supervisory
responsibilities over later appointed Book-Club Directors than
did the claimant.
Consequently

I find substantial differences between the

two in scope of job assignments, and conclude that the salary
differential, in part, was legitimately based on the extra duties
and responsibilities assumed by Apple and attendant to his higher titled jobs.
Finally, and probably most determinative, I conclude that
between the Book Clubs directed by the claimant and those for
which Apple was responsible, there were significant differences
in importance, prestige, financial return and potential, all
supportive of higher pay for Apple.
The Company submitted into evidence financial and sales
data designed to show that the Behavioral Science Book Club
which Apple directed throughout was the "largest, most important
and most prestigious of the various Macmillan book clubs," and
more profitable than the clubs directed by the claimant.
assertions are disputed by the claimant who

These

submitted her own

financial and sales data designed to support her position.

The

arbitrator is in no position to make a determination on that
question independent of the record before him, and unless the
evidence on those issues is compellingly

favorable to the claim-

ant, the arbitrator is disinclined to substitute his judgement
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for the Company's business judgement in those areas.
The evidence on these points is not compelling or even
preponderantly supportive of the claimant's position.

Rather,

though the parties are in sharp disagreement over the economics
and financial return of the Behavioral Science Book Club as
compared to the Early Learning Book Club; the Library of Contemporary Education and the Teacher Book Club directed by the claimant, the Company's data represents the criteria

and methodology

regularly and normally used by the Company in evaluating the
production, sales, investment and financial return of its book
clubs.

I find no justification in the record for this arbitrator

to substitute a different financial analysis or a different evaluation of the activity of the book clubs involved for the methods
regularly utilized by the Company in judging how the sales,
investments, and profitability of its book clubs are and should
be calculated.

Especially so, when as here, there is no evidence

that the Company used a different methodology or changed its
regular criteria for this case.
The Company offered testimony that it has been its
consistent policy to pay a higher salary to a book club director
in charge of a club that is more important, more prestigious and
financially more consequential.

Any such salary differential,

when compared with what is paid a book club director who is in
charge of a club or clubs of less status is legitimate and properly
based, particularly, where as here, the evidence on that policy
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stands unrefuted.
It is also noted that Apple was not confined just to
the Behavioral Science Book Club.
two additional clubs as well.

He took over supervision of

Therefore, the fact that the

claimant had responsibility for three clubs is not, standing
alone, any basis to warrant a salary equal to what was paid
Apple.
For the foregoing reasons, namely greater experience at
the point of hire; longer job tenure throughout the relevant
period; performance of and responsibility for additional duties
attendant to higher titles; and responsibility for a more import
ant and prestigious book club, I find the salary differential
and its spread during the period in question to have been
justified and lawful.
Christine

Grove

The claimant was hired in October 1973 as an Associate
Editor at a salary of $12,000 a year.

She was assigned to the

"Price Project" and continued on that assignment during the full
relevant period.

In April 1974 she was promoted to Project

Editor and was increased in salary to $13,200.
further salary increase to $15,850 in August

She received a

1974.

She compares herself to Pierce Nylund who was hired as
a Project Editor in September 1963 at $15,000 a year and who
was increased in salary to $15,850 in September 1974.

Nylund
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was assigned to the "Faissler Project."
The claimant asserts that at all times she did the same
type of work as Nylund irrespective of his initial higher title
and should have received comparable pay throughout the relevant
period.
Though I find substantial similarities in the work
performed by the claimant and Nylund I nonetheless cannot ascribe
the salary differential to sex discrimination.
At the point of hire Nylund had had a previous period
of service of five years with the Company from 1966 to 1971 in
its Social Studies Department.

That previous tenure with the

Company is a legitimate ground to reemploy him at similar work
at a salary higher than that paid to the claimant who had not
had previous service with the Company (though she did have some
experience in this type of work from prior employment elsewhere.
Additionally, I am persuaded that Nylund was hired at the higher
salary not necessarily because he was appointed initially as a
Project Editor, but because the Company believe he had the
potential for and would be assigned additional responsibilities
in other capacities soon after he was reemployed.

The combina-

tion of prior tenure with the Company in work similar to the
latter period of employment and the expectation that he could
and would take over additional duties and responsibilities is
sufficiently set forth in the record to rebut any contention tha
the pay differential at the point of hire was based on the
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difference in their sexes.

Neither of these conditions applied

to the claimant when she was hired.
That Nylund did not take on the additional assignments
and responsibilities does not nullify the legitimacy of paying
him more at the point of hire in expectation that he would do
so.

Indeed, the fact that the claimant received three salary

increases totalling $3,850 and achieved parity with Nylund in
less than a year, while Nylund was increased by only $850 in the
same period is evidence that Nylund did not fulfill the potential
on which his salary upon hire was in part based, and is evidence
of the claimant's demonstrated ability and merit.

In other

words the Company gave the claimant salary increases that closed
the gap between her and Nylund because she merited those increases and because Nylund did not fulfill the expectations
upon which his initial salary was based.
The question then is whether the delay in bringing the
claimant up to Nylund's salary level was because she was a
woman? I answer in the negative.

The authoritative

testimony

and evidence in the record reveal that the Faissler Project on
which Nylund worked was larger, involved a substantially greater
investment and was significantly more profitable than the Price
Project on which the claimant worked.

Again, that it was

Company policy to pay higher salaries for work on more important
projects is not refuted.

I cannot say that that policy is not

a bona fide circumstance to justify salary differentials.

-16-

Accordingly, for the reasons of prior experience and
tenure with the Company, and because of the greater importance
to the Company of his work assignment, I must conclude that the
Company had legitimate grounds to pay more to Nylund than to
the claimant during the period in question.
Julie Small
The claimant, hired as a Project Editor in the School
Department in January 1974 at $14,000 a year also compares herself with Pierce Nylund.
The reasons for my ruling in the Grove case are applicable here.

Unlike the claimant, Nylund had five years of prev-

ious service with the Company as an Associate Editor between
1966 and 1971 which standing alone would justify a $1,000 differ
ential at the point of hire, despite the fact that the claimant
had previous relevant experience with other employers.
However, any doubt on that point must be resolved against the claim by the fact that unlike the claimant Nylund
was also hired with the expectation that he would take on additional work, and more significantly his assignment to the
Faissler Project was unquestionably of much greater importance
and consequence to the Company than the supplemental reading
program supervised by the claimant in a totally different
department.
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Carol Weitz
The facts in this case demonstrate in my judgement
substantial inequities to the claimant for which she should have
received higher pay.

But I do not find that the Company's fail-

ure to accord her that higher pay was because she was a woman.
Her first claim for the period February 1974 to July
1974 is for the pay which her superior received, based on her
assertion that when he left and was not replaced she assumed
and regularly performed the duties of his job.
The claimant was hired on October 22, 1973 as Promotion
Manager for the Library Series Division at $12,500 a year.
was raised to $13,020 on June 3, 1974.

She

Her superior, as Market-

ing Manager was Theodore Sennett whose salary was $23,540.
Sennett resigned on February 22, 1974 and his job remained unfilled for five months.
I am persuaded that during those five months the claimant took on and diligently performed, both during regular hours
and on overtime, many of the duties previously handled by
Sennett.

She received no additional pay for doing so.

Bluntly

put, I believe the Company took advantage not only of the claimant but other incumbent employees in the department by "parceling out" Sennett's work among them in varying quantities, without paying any of them additional compensation.

I am persuaded

that the claimant was most affected by this arrangement because
of the substantial number of additional duties she assumed.

In
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that respect the inequity and the unfairness of adding duties
to her already full job load without additional compensation
was felt more by the claimant than others.

Clearly she was en-

titled to extra pay because she took on extra work previously
performed by a higher rated employee, but I do not find that
she was denied that extra compensation because she was a woman.
The Company took advantage of her willingness to take on the wort
and apparently gave her some positive indications that she would
receive a salary adjustment, but it also, albeit to a lesser
extent, took advantage of other employees including male employees
Some of Sennett's duties were assumed by Alan Smith a
Company Vice-President and a male.

Some other work previously

performed by Sennett was taken over by others, including male
employees in the department, again without extra compensation.
Without delineating the precise duties assumed, I conclude that
Smith took on Sennett's policy making functions and the claimant
took on most of Sennett's administrative duties and the implementation of policy.

Others assumed less important routine

functions.
On that factual determination, while I do not hesitate
to observe that the Company handled the claimant unjustly and
inequitably and failed to tangibly reward her for her loyality,
diligence and acknowledged good work, the evidence is just not
there to support a charge that all this took place only or
primarily because the claimant is a woman.

In labor relations
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terms, the Company's error was in failing to pay her extra
compensation for her performance of a large number of higher
rated duties irrespective of, but not because of her sex.
The claimant's second claim is for the period April
1974 to August 1974.

She asserts that while she was a Promotion

Manager earning the pay referred to above, the Company hired
Barry Feig as a Senior Copywriter at a higher salary of $14,000
a year.

In making a comparison with Feig the claimant asserts

that his position was below hers in the Company hierarchy; that
she regularly edited his copy and gave him advice and instructions
which he carried out in performing his work.
I am not persuaded by the Company's contention that the
claimant and Feig are not comparable because of different functions, nor do I

accept the Company's assertion that because

Feig technically reported to a Company vice-president he
occupied a higher position than the claimant in the Company's
hierarchy.

The fact is that had there been a Marketing Manager

replacing Sennett, both Feig and the claimant would have reportec
to that Marketing Manager (as indeed both did after Sennett's
job was filled).

Also the copy writing work performed by Feig

and the promotional duties of the claimant were jointly related
to the work of the same department and in that respect can be
compared in terms of

respective responsibilities, importance,

acquired skill and performance.
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On the other hand I do not find the claimant's assertion
that she had some sort of instructional authority over Feig's
work to be determinative.
that were lateral.

I conclude that they occupied positions

What is relevant is simply the answer to the

question - why Feig was hired at $14,000 a year when the claimant whose position was lateral was earning somewhat less?

I am

satisfied that that happened because that's what Feig demanded
and that's what it took to hire a qualified and senior copywriter
in the job market at that time.

I conclude that the Company did

not raise the claimant's salary correspondingly simply and solely
because it thought it unnecessary to do so, not because she was
a woman but because she was an incumbent employee without any
bargaining leverage.

And because technically the Company could

rely upon its policy of reviewing salaries only on a set schedule.
I consider what the Company did to be unfair, unequitable,
to employee morale and poor personnel practices.

inimical

But I cannot

find that itwas done because the claimant was a woman or that
it was an act of sex

discrimination.

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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During the periods of time set forth in
the stipulated issues, the Company did
not discriminate on the basis of sex with
regard to the salaries it paid to Leila
Mustachi, Christine Grove, Julie Small and
Carol Weitz. The claims of those individuals
are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 27 , 1977
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF Bronx - )
On this twenty-se\erth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery
Workers Union, Local No. 365

OPINION AND AWARD

and
American Smelting and Refining
Company (Perth Amboy Plant)
The stipulated issue is:
Under the contract what is the proper
vacation bonus for the eleven grievants?
A hearing was held at the Company plant on October 25,
1976 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
This case involves the question of whether employees who
retire are entitled to a vacation bonus under Article VII Section
6 of the contract and a retirement pension at the same time.
The eleven grievants retired during the period for which Section
6 of Article VII accords a vacation bonus of $50 a week for
vacations commenced during that time.

It is the Union's con-

tention that they should be deemed on vacation, and paid a
vacation bonus for vacations due them at the time they retired
and at the same time they receive pension payments.

The Union

argues that other employees, similarly situated, received vacation bonuses in accordance with the Article VII Section 6
schedule when they retired and that the grievants should be
treated no differently.

-2It is the Company's contention that the grievants were in
retirement status during the calendar period that a $50 a week
vacation bonus is paid to those commencing vacations; that the
status of retirement is simply inconsistent with "commencing a
vacation", and that the grievants cannot be entitled to a vacation bonus at the same time that they are retired and receiving
a retirement pension.

Instead, in addition to their accumulated

or unused vacations under other Sections of Article VII the
Company paid them a $20 a week bonus for their remaining vacation entitlement, pursuant to that portion of Article VII
Section 6 which reads:
The $20 bonus shall be paid for vacation
weeks paid in lieu of time off.
Based on the record it is apparent to me that the circumstances of this case were not contemplated by the parties at
the time that Article VII Section 6 was written.

It is undisputed

that when this contract provision was negotiated the parties
did not discuss whether employees commencing retirement would
also receive a vacation bonus if their retirement began during
the bonus months set forth in Article VII Section 6.

I am

persuaded that the vacation bonus section of the contract was
not intended or designed, one way or the other, to apply to
employees who retire.

Indeed, I agree with the Union that the

provision for a $20 bonus to be paid "in lieu of time off" was
intended to apply not to the facts in this case, but to
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situations where employees actually worked through their vacation.

But if retirees are not covered by that bonus, and if as

I have held Section 6 was not written to cover the instant
situation at all, the grievants would not even be entitled to
the $20 a week bonus which the Company granted them.

(In this

proceeding the Company does not seek to nor will I deprive the
grievants of that bonus.)

Under those circumstances it is

difficult to see how the Company's refusal to pay a vacation
bonus of $50 a week to the grievants was violative of that
Section of the contract.
Moreover, the absence of a contract violation is supported
by the language of Section 6 and, contrary to the Union's assertion, I do not find an applicable past practice.

A pertinent

part of Section 6 reads:
The amount of vacation bonus applicable
to a particular vacation week.... shall
be determined by the calendar month in
which such week commences that is, the
first day thereof the employee would have
been scheduled to work. (Emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing language, it is clear to me that the
vacation bonus was intended to be paid to employees for vacation time which would coincide with days that they would be at
work had they not been on vacation.
case with the grievants.

Manifestly this is not the

They left the active employ of the

Company not on a day that they would otherwise have been scheduled
to work, but rather terminated their employment entirely and

-4commenced retirement status drawing a retirement pension.
Finally, the Union's reliance on past practice is
inapposite.

Other retirees whom the Union asserts were situated

similarly to the grievants, were not so situated.

The group of

employees who "returned for a single day", did not draw their
pension until after they returned for that single day.

They

first exhausted their vacation entitlement, and did not draw
vacation bonus and a retirement pension simultaneously.

Some

other employees were handled in the same manner, except that
they did not return to the Company's employ for the single day
between exhausting their vacation and commencing

retirement.

But again, unlike what is claimed for the grievants, they did
not draw both vacation bonus and a retirement pension simultaneously.

I do not consider these to be merely distinctions

without a difference.

Unlike the grievants, the other employees

cited chose to defer receipt of their pensions for a period of
time while exhausting their vacation benefits.

The grievants

however received their pension benefits immediately upon leaving
active employment, thereby enjoying that benefit earlier than
the others cited.

And in addition the grievants received the

$20 vacation bonus "in lieu of time off."

Had the grievants

sought to be treated like the others cited, and had they been
denied any such request, I think they may have been able to make
out a case of unequal treatment.

But the record does not indic-

ate that they sought to be treated similarly when they were

-5eligible to retire- And, considering that they chose instead
to retire and draw retirement pensions immediately, I do not
think that I have the authority to retroactively place them
back at a point similar to the others, nor do I think that it
is now legally or fiscally possible to do so.
In short, I cannot find in the contract or in practice
a consistency between "being on vacation" and "being in retirement status."

Absent an explicit contract provision reconciling

the two, I must conclude that they are mutually

inconsistent*

therefore I cannot award a vacation bonus to the grievants at
and for the same time that they are retired.
This holding is not to be confused with the undisputed
contractual right of an employee to receive pay for his accumulated regular vacation entitlement when he retires.

This case

does not deal with accumulated or accrued vacation rights.
Rather it deals with a vacation bonus as "an add-to and not part
of, ....regular vacation pay."

As is traditional, the grievants

received their regular vacation pay and/or regular vacation
entitlement under the other Sections of Article VII.

But it is

not traditional, nor can I find proper support to grant a vacation bonus

over and above regular vacation pay merely because

the grievants retired during a calendar period when a vacation
bonus is contractually paid to those who go on vacation at that
time.

-6The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's claim that the grievants are
entitled to a $50 a week vacation bonus
under Article VII Section 6 of the contract
is denied.

ErieO. Schmert

DATED: January 13, 1977
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this thirteenth day of January, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IBEW, Local

1501

OPINION AND AWARD
76K25101

and
American Totalisator Systems

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the thirty day
suspension of Alan Goldstein? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hempstead, New York on May 17, 1977
at which time Mr. Goldstein, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Company charges that the grievant was intoxicated while
at work.
The Company's testimony regarding the grievant"s physical
condition, conduct, demeanor and other symptoms and characteristics upon which it concluded that he was intoxicated, is not
denied by the grievant.

Rather, in denying that he had been

drinking to the point of intoxication, the grievant asserts and
explains that his condition must have been due to the combination
of two mgs. valium . which he took at between 6 and 7 am, and two
glasses of beer he consumed later that day at lunch between 2 and

3 pm.

-2Absent medical or other authoritative testimony or evidence,
I am not persuaded that the grievant's explanation is either
medically sound or even a causal probability.
reject his explanation.

Therefore I must

Accordingly, considering the presence

of symptoms, demeanor, etc. which traditionally are deemed
probative evidence of intoxication, I must conclude that the
Company had reasonable grounds to believe that the grievant
was intoxicated.
Inasmuch as the Company rules, unchallenged by the Union
in this proceeding, provide for the penalty of discharge for
"reporting for work under the influence of an intoxicant

",

the lesser penalty of thirty days suspension imposed on the
grievant was per force proper.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the thirty day
suspension of Alan Goldstein.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 27, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On this twenty seventh day of June, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Ansonia Federation of Teachers AFT
Local 1012, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0339 76

and
Ansonia Board of Education

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Board violate the contract,
established policy and its statutory
duty to negotiate by unilaterally
adopting an employee dress code policy?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Board on
January 10, 1977 at which time representatives of the Union
and Board appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hear-

ing briefs.
It is well settled that absent an explicit contract
provision to the contrary an employer has the managerial right
to promulgate rules of conduct, provided those rules are
reasonable, related to the nature of the employment, well
disseminated and consistently and uniformly applied.
A rule or policy regarding what a teacher may or may not
wear while on the job is within that managerial prerogative.

-2In the instant case I find that the dress code policy
adopted by the Board meets the foregoing test, and I find
nothing in the contract or in the relevant collective bargaining statute which restricts the Board's right to promulgate
such policy.
That the joint Effective Schools Committee once handled
a grievance over how a particular teacher was to dress, and
in the process set forth some guidelines on that subject, did
not in my judgement transform a traditional managerial right
into a bilaterally negotiated condition of employment, nor did
it establish a binding practice.

The fact is that the Board

did not adopt the guideline as its policy, and did not in any
other way relinquish its authority to make official policy on
that question.
This is not to say that disputes over the interpretation,
implementation or application of that policy would not be the
subject of bilateral discussions or even matters for the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.

Rather

it is to say that the Board did not violate the contract,
established policy or its statutory duty by unilaterally
promulgating the disputed dress policy.

If the policy is vague

or not consistently or uniformly applied, or if there are other;
questions or disputes over its application and/or implementation,
such questions or disputes would be proper subjects for bilateral discussions and/or for the grievance and arbitration
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provisions of the contract.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Board did not violate the
contract, established policy
and the statutory duty to
negotiate by unilaterally adopting an employee dress code policy.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 7, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of February, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executec
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Paint, Chemical, Clerical, Warehouse
and Industrial Workers Union, Local
1310, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Ashland Chemical Company

In accordance with Article VII of the collective bargaining
agreement dated December 1, 1976 through February 28, 1980 between
Paint, Chemical, Clerical, Warehouse and Industrial Workers Union,
Local 1310, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and
Ashland Chemical Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company"
the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
disputes between the Union and Company involving Union grievances
#s7705 and 7707.
A hearing was held at the offices of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Services in East Orange, New Jersey, on October
5, 1977 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

witnesses.

The

Both sides filed post-hearing briefs

The stipulated issues are:
1.

What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance #7705 dated May 10,
1977?

2.

What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance #7707 dated May 12,
1977.
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In substance, grievance #7705 claims that employee Craig
Mazepa who was called in Sunday, May 1, 1977 at 11 PM and worked
until 6 AM May 2, 1977 should have been paid at double time for
the first four hours of that work and grievance #7707 seeks four
hours pay at the overtime rate for employee Theodore White whom
the Union contends should have been assigned overtime work on
May 12, 1977.
The Union's grievance #7705 must be denied under the clear
and express language of Sections 4.05 A and 4.01 of the contract.
Mazepa, worked only one hour on Sunday May 1, 1977 within
the same work week.

Section 4.05 of the contract reads:

An employee who works a full Monday-throughFriday schedule or is credited with working
such schedule shall be paid two times his regular straight time rate for hours he works on
Sunday of the same work week, (emphasis added)
There is no dispute that his regular work schedule was
Monday through Friday and that he was called in at 11 PM on
Sunday outside of that schedule.

However the work week, for the

instant purpose of defining the phrase "the same work week" is
specified in Section 4.01 of the agreement.

In pertinent part it

states:
The work week will start at 12.01 AM on
Monday and end at 12 Midnight the following Sunday.
Based on the foregoing contract language, it is clear that
the grievant's hours of work following midnight Sunday May 1, 1977
were working hours at the beginning of a new and subsequent work

-3week and were not a continuation of "Sunday hours" which began at
11 PM Sunday, May 1st.

As such the Company compensated him

correctly by paying him double time for his one hour of work on
Sunday May llth within the same work week, and at the time
and one-half rate for his Monday morning hours of work thereafter.
The Union asserts that by past practice employees called in
on a Sunday outside of their regular work schedule have not only
been guaranteed four hours of work or pay but four hours at double
time.

However the Union's case in this regard was limited to bare

allegations and not supported either by direct evidence by the
employees who allegedly received that benefit, nor by any other
alternative probative evidence.

However that is not material be-

cause it is well settled that past practice is binding only where
contract language is ambiguous.

Where as here, the contract

language is clear and explicit it prevails over any contrary past
practice.
Therefore neither by practice nor under its specific language
can Section 3.05, which is principally relied upon in this case
by the Union, be interpreted the Union's way.

That Section provides

for a guarantee of four hours pay when an employee is called in.
However it stipulates that the four hour guarantee shall be "at
his regular rate."

In the instant case by operation of Sections

4.01 and 4.05A, the regular rate is the rate applicable to work
performed on Sunday within the same work week, and the rate
applicable for work performed thereafter at the beginning of a

-4subsequent week.

Consequently in this case the grievant's regular

rate for the more than four hours of work which he performed beginning at 11 PM

on Sunday was properly at double time for the

remaining one hour on Sunday within that work week, and time and
one-half for the additional hours on Monday morning the next week.
Nothing in Section 3.05 mandates the payment of the first four hours
of work under that circumstance at the double time rate.

Accord-

ingly the Union's grievance #7705 is denied.
I grant the Union's grievance #7707 because I am persuaded
that the Company's warehouse supervisor, whether purposefully or
inadvertently,reasonably led the Union's chief steward to believe
that three employees were needed on an overtime basis to perform
work involving the capping and moving of drums of chemicals in the
warehouse.

I do not dispute the Company's argument that only two

rather than three employees were needed to perform what work was
available.

Nor do I dispute the Company's assertion that the

classification of the employees permitted them to perform the work
assigned and that there was no classification or job description
reason to require a third warehouseman or warehouseman-lift truck
driver.
But based on the testimony, including the testimony of the
Company's warehouse supervisor, I conclude that the conversation
between the supervisor and the union steward concerned the former's
request that the latter obtain both a warehouseman and two tow or
lift truck operators for specific assignment to work on the drums.

-5It is undisputed that overtime on this type of work in the
warehouse is scheduled by a request from the supervisor to the
Union's steward, and that the steward obtains the required number
of employees in the required classifications.

So the procedure

employed in this case was consistent with that arrangement, and
if, as I have found, the Company's supervisor requested three
employees to work overtime on the drums, I do not believe that the
Company should now be permitted to avoid that committment on the
grounds that, after the fact, it has been determined that only
two were actually required and that any use of a third employee
was for other duties.
The Company argues, assuming arguendo the validity of the
foregoing, that no contract provision was breached and that the
Union has failed to point to any specific contract section on which
its grievance is based.

I do not consider it a fatal defect that

the Union has not cited a specific contract breach in its case
presentation,

Implicit in its complaint, as I see it, is the

claim that the Company's failure to call in or assign a third
employee in accordance with the supervisor's request, violated
Article IV of the contract and more specifically the overtime
provisions therein.

In other words, having asked for three

-6employees to work on the capping of drums, or to have reasonably
led the union steward to believe that three employees were needed
for that work, a schedule of overtime for three employees was
fixed.

Under that circumstance those employees who would have

been entitled to the overtime based upon whatever overtime
eligibility arrangement the parties follow, should have been
afforded the opportunity to work.

There is no contention by the

Company that the grievant Theodore White would not have been the
employee eligible for the overtime in place of Steward McGrath
had in fact three employees been required and scheduled.

That

White had left the plant did not in my view disqualify him from
the overtime opportunity in those circumstances.

Accordingly,

for the limited reason that I believe the warehouse supervisor
scheduled three employees to work overtime on the drums and there
by bound the Company to that schedule, the Union's grievance is
granted and the Company is directed to pay the grievant four hour
pay at the overtime rate.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following Award:
1.

The Union's grievance #7705 is denied.

2.

The Union's grievance #7707 is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: December 1, 1977
STATE OF New York ).Ss:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this first day of December, 1977, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
Atlantic Independent Union
and

:
:
:

AWARD
Case #14 30 0707 76M/D

*
•

Atlantic Richfield Company

:

The Undersigned, duly designated as the arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, make

the following AWARD:

The Union's grievance dated June 8,
1976, and marked as Joint Exhibit
#1 in the record, is denied.

DATED: September

DATED:

DATED:

September

September

1977

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

1977

Frank W. Welsh
Concurring

1977

John Nussbaumer
Dissenting

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
Atlantic Independent Union
and
Atlantic Richfield Company

:
:
:

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #14 30 0707 76M/D

:

In accordance with Article IX of the collective bargaining
agreement dated July 1, 1975 between Atlantic Independent Union,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and Atlantic Richfield
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", the Undersigned
was selected as the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration
to hear and decide, together with the Union and Company designees
to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance dated June 8, 1976
marked as Joint Exhibit No. 1 in the
record?
Messrs. John Nussbaumer and Frank W. Welsh served respectively as the Union and Company Arbitrators.
A hearing was held at the Philadelphia offices of the
American Arbitration Association on May 9, 1977 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were affordec
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The Board of Arbitration met in Executive Session on
September 12, 1977.

-2The Union's grievance dated June 8, 1976 reads:
The above mentioned employees are grieving according to their rights as stated
in Article VIII of the Contract between
Atlantic Independent Union and the Atlantic
Richfield Company.
The grievants feel that management discriminated against them when their names were
removed from the eligibility list for the
job vacancies at the Philadelphia Refinery.
The Union and the grievants concur that the
Company is in violation of Article XII, paragraph (b) of the collective bargaining agreement by implementing its intention to fill
these job openings by hiring persons from
outside rather than by promoting from within.
As the grievance indicates the Union relies on Article
XII Paragraph (b) of the contract.

That Section reads:

Employees desiring consideration for a
particular job should register such desire
with the appropriate Employee Relations
office, and the COMPANY will make every
reasonable effort to promote from within
before hiring outside the COMPANY.
The jobs which the grievants sought are classified as
Utility Operators in the Refinery.
jobs are at the entry level.

It is undisputed that those

The Company contends that Article

XII Paragraph (b) is inapplicable to the facts herein because that
contract section relates to "promotions."

The Company argues that

the applications by incumbent grievants for entry level positions
in the refinery are simply not promotions, and that therefore the
Company had no contractual obligation to consider them for those
jobs before hiring from the outside or recalling persons whose

-3recall rights had expired.
In the instant case the Company filled the Utility Operator
vacancies in three ways; by employees who possessed the requisite
qualifications and who had recall rights under the contract; with
former employees who had refinery experience but whose recall
rights had expired; and by hiring four women who had neither refinery experience nor previously worked for the Company pursuant
to an affirmative action agreement between the Company and the EEOC.
Alternatively the Company asserts that not withstanding its
lack of obligation under the contract, the grievants, together
with those to whom the jobs
were assigned were considered, but the
.
; grievants were rejected because they did not pass a job test and
had not had previous refinery experience.
The Union contends that the grievants' bids for the Utility
Operator jobs in the refinery constituted "promotions" within the
intent of Article XII Paragraph (b).

It argues that when that

contract section was negotiated it was understood and agreed between
the parties that any bid on a job opening would be treated as a
"promotion", especially if the job sought would enable the bidder
to earn more money, even if it was an entry level position, and
that "a promotion is in the eyes of the beholder."

Under those

circumstances the Union urges the Arbitrators to interpret a job
"promotion" in its "normal and customary way, according it a liberal
and broad meaning.
As I see it, the difficulty with the Union's case is that a

-4"normal and customary" interpretation of the word "promote" as
found in Article XII Paragraph (b) would not produce the result
sought by the Union.

To deem the filling of entry level jobs as

"promotions" would be, in my view, an unusual and non-traditional
use of the word "promote."

A "promotion" in an industrial relations

setting has a well established and undisputed meaning.

It means

to move upward from one classification to a higher classified job
in the job classification hierarchy.

Though usually an increase

in pay attends such a move, it is not invariable and hence not a
determinative characteristic of a promotion.

There are instances

in which such upward movement may not produce an immediate pay
increase, and indeed, occasionally a promotion may result in a pay
decrease, albeit for a temporary period of time.

To treat the

filling of an entrance level job as synonymous with a promotion
just because greater earnings are possible is a special and unique
interpretation which, to be upheld, must be supported by clear
evidence of intent and/or past practice.
The evidence in the record does not support the Union's
assertion that the applications of the grievants for these entrance
level jobs in the refinery constituted or should be interpreted
as promotions within the meaning of Article XII Paragraph (b) of
the contract.

The contract negotiations relating to that section

and the practice thereafter support

the Company's argument and

not the interpretation which the Union places on the word "promote

-5In the negotiations leading to the contract clause in question,
the Union urged that incumbent employees of the Company be given
first consideration in the filling of job vacancies and that hiring from the outside should be confined to entry level positions.
At this arbitration hearing the Union stated that it never intended to exempt entry level jobs from the priority requests of
incumbent employees.

If that is so it remains a bare assertion

in this record, and consequently does not overturn the considerably more explicit and probative evidence that at negotiations
the Union's demand for priority for incumbent employees

related

to job vacancies above the entry level.
Moreover, not only has there not been a practice
supportive
"
of the Union's interpretation, but the practice has been to the
contrary.

The Company has consistently filled entry level jobs

by hiring new employees from the outside, and has not given prior
'
consideration to incumbent employees.

The Union's explanation

that this occurred during a period of full employment and was not
objectionable under that circumstance, is not enough to establish
any contrary practice.
In short, neither by the history of negotiations nor by
practice is there evidence to give to the word "promote" a meaning
which would apply to the filling of the entry level job of Utility
Operator in the refinery.
I understand how and why the Union views these circumstances
as inequitable and as a "moral issue."

The Union sees new hires
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coming in to the refinery or the return of former employees whose
recall rights have been exhausted at a time when incumbent employees
in other departments face possible layoffs in the foreseeable
future.

The Union thinks that incumbent employees whose jobs

may be ended or transferred

to other geographical locations

ought to be accorded an opportunity to fill permanent vacancies
in the refinery, thereby securing their employment status with
the Company.
This Arbitrator is not unsympathetic to that position.
Without judging whether the Union's facts are correct, he understands and appreciates what the Union characterizes as a "moral
issue."

However the arbitrator's authority does not extend to

a "moral" resolution of a dispute but instead is confined to the
provisions of the contract.

If what the Company has done is per-

mitted under the contract, the question of whether it is "morally1
correct is not for the arbitrator.

Here I am unable to find that

Article XII Paragraph (b) supports the Union's case.

Contrary-

wise I find that that contract section permits the Company to do
what it did.

If the Union believes that result to be inequitable,

unfair or unresponsive to the "moral issue" it raises, redress
must be sought in the forum of collective bargaining and not in
arbitration.
Accordingly the grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATE: September

1977

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local Lodge No. 1396, District #170
International Association of
Machinists and Aero Space Workers,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0195 76

The Atlantic Wire Company

In accordance with Article V of the collective bargaining
agreement dated March 1, 1976 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was the grievant, Henk Jansen discharged
for just cause? If not what should be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Branford, Connecticut on December 1,
1976 at which time the grievant and representatives of the Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The parties waived the Arbitrator's Oath.

Both sides submitted post-hearing briefs.
The charge against the grievant is that he falsely inflated
the productivity of the three-man Small Cleaning House crew of
which he was a member.

As a consequence, the Company asserts,

the grievant and the two other members of that crew (Messrs.
Villane and Newman) were paid more than they earned.
Initially, all three crew members were suspended, but

-2-

following an investigation

Newman and Villane were reinstated

with full pay and benefits, and the grievant was discharged.
The Company explains it had no evidence that Newman and
Villane were involved in falsifying the production records of
the crew.

It asserts however that the grievant should be held

solely responsible because as the "coater", it was his job to
fill out the daily production report, and that on the day involved, May 20, 1976, he did so.
The Company's case is principally directed toward establishing that

the production records of May 20, 1976 were

false and in excess of what the crew actually produced.
However the Company's burden in this case is twofold.
Assuming arguendo that it can show that the production records
were falsely recorded it has the companion and further burden
of showing not only that the grievant knowingly made the recordings but that the other two members of the crew, who worked
with the grievant that night , and who were paid on the basis
of the group productivity, did not know what was going

on.

It is well settled that where prima facie, employees are
similarly situated, they must be treated similarly.

And if three

employees appear to be involved in an act of misconduct, the
Company's decision to discipline one and to exonerate the other
two must be justified by persuasive and distinguishing evidence.
In the instant case, unless the Company can demonstrate that
there is an evidentiary basis to treat the grievant differently

-3from the other two members of the crew, the grievant's discharge cannot stand even if the Company's case on false productivity reports can be substantiated.
Based on the record before me, I find that I need not
determine whether the production records on May 20, 1976 were
falsely inflated, because even if they were, the Company has not
satisified me that the grievant should have been treated differently from the other two members of the crew.

As I see it,

and as more fully explained below, either all three should have
been restored to duty without penalty, or all three should have
been disciplined equally, leaving the evidentiary test of
distinctions between and amongst them, if any, to the grievance
and arbitration

forum.

The principal reason advanced by the Company to support
the grievant's discharge was because he filled out the production report.

However the grievant denied filling out the full

report, asserting that a significant portion, including much of
the disputed productivity, was not filled out by him.
testimony on that score stands unrefuted.

His

Indeed an examination

of the production sheet indicates a different handwriting for
certain significant items of productivity which the Company
contends were falsified.

While the record does not disclose

who may have filled out that portion of the production record,
the allegation that the grievant was solely responsible for
recording the productivity that night is not supported by the

-4evidence.

Hence, the Company's principal reason for affixing

blame solely on the grievant is unproved by the quantum of
evidence required in disciplinary matters.
Moreover, I do not find it to be an adequate distinction
between the grievant on one hand and the other two members of
the crew on the other, for the Company to merely assert that
it had no evidence of the participation of the other two
employees in the alleged falsification of the production records
That simply begs the question and does not meet the Company's
burden in such cases.

The Company's burden is to show a

substantive distinction between the employee disciplined and
those exonerated, in order for the discharge to stand if the
charge against the discharged employee is proved.
substantive distinctions in the records.

I find no

The Company's explana-

tion that it believed it had a case against the grievant but
not against the other two members of the crew, does not meet
the required test.
The fact is that there are circumstances which bind all
three employees together and make them similarly situated,
guilty or innocent.

The first is that each member of the crew

is paid based on the productivity of the entire crew.

It is

inconceivable to me, and contrary to my experience, for employees
who are jointly paid based on joint productivity not to be fully
familiar with how much they produced at any given time.

I

simply do not believe, irrespective of whether the disputed
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productivity was accurate or inflated, that all three members
of the crew did not know precisely how much production was
recorded for their shift on May 20, 1976.

In this connection,

the grievant and Villane were each overpaid $11.61 and Newman
was overpaid $11.11 if the production was falsified.

I do not

accept the notion that Newman and Villane would not have related their pay to their productivity or would not have known
if there was a discrepancy between what they produced and what
was recorded.
Also significant to my mind is the fact that on prior
occasions the Company suspected that this very crew was engaged
in a practice similar to what the grievant is singly charged
with in the instant case. On those occasions supervision
cautioned all members of the crew.

Thereafter, by the Company's

own testimony, the alleged fraudulent practices ceased, or,
took a different form.

The significance is inescapable - namely

that following individual and joint notice of the Company's
suspicion, the crew as a whole changed its practices, whether
or not any prior practice was improper.

In short, in a number

of relevant and evidentiary ways the Company has tied each
member of the crew together.

Having done so, I fail to see

how in the instant case it can now separate the grievant from
the crew as a joint entity, for radically disparate disciplinary
action.
This is not to say that the grievant did not falsify the

-6productivity records.
not.

I do not decide whether he did or did

Instead it is my determination that if he is responsible,

the Company has not shown that that responsibility or culpability was unique to the grievant.

Therefore, the well settled

rule of even-handed treatment must apply.

All three should

have been treated alike, because if there was misconduct, the
evidence does not show that it was any more the individual
misconduct of the grievant than the group misconduct of all
three members of the crew.

To reinstate Newman and Villane wit

full benefits and to discharge the grievant is to discriminate
against the grievant, the falsification of the production
records notwithstanding.
For the foregoing reasons I have no choice but to direct
that the grievant be reinstated with full back pay and benefits
in the same manner accorded Villane and Newman.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Henk Jansen is reversed.
He shall be reinstated with full back pay
and benefits.

Erie" J. Schmertz
DATED: February 7, 1977
STATE OF New York ) ss>:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of February, 1977, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 542, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 0657 77 J

and
Bechtel Corporation

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement effective May 1, 1975 to April
30, 1978 between International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 542, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and
Bechtel Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issues:
1. Were the layoffs of Robert J. Hansbury
and Thomas Maberry, Jr. in violation of
Article IV Section 4 and/or Article II
Section 2(c) of the collective bargaining
agreement? If so what shall be the remedy?
2. Was the layoff of Joseph Polito in violation of Article IV Section 4 and/or
Article II Section 2(c) of the collective
bargaining agreement? If so what shall be
the remedy?
3. Was the layoff of Ralph Zarnowski in
violation of Article IV Section 4 and/or
Article II Section 2(c) of the collective
bargaining agreement? If so what shall be
the remedy?
4. Was the layoff of William J. Garlick in
violation of Article IV Section 4 and/or
Article II Section 2(c) of the collective
bargaining agreement? If so what shall be
the remedy?

-2A hearing was held at the Philadelphia office of the
American Arbitration Association on August 29, 1977 at which
time each of the above named individuals, hereinafter referred
to either by name or as the "grievant(s)", and representatives
of the Union and Company, appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
Article IV Section 4 reads in pertinent part:
Weekly Pay
When employees covered by this agreement
report for starting work, they shall be entitled to work until the end of his job and
shall not be replaced before the conclusion
of their job except for just cause. If their
job continues for more than five (5) days,
said employees shall be on forty (40) hour
weekly guarantee basis at the weekly rate for
the elapsed working days while their job lasts

The pertinent part of Article II Section 2(c) reads:
"
no employee shall be discharged
except for just cause."
In each case the Union, on behalf of the grievant(s)
contends that the layoffs were violative of Article IV Section
4 of the contract in that the grievant(s) were not permitted
"to work until the end of his job" and "were replaced before the
conclusion of their job."
Because the Union deems the layoffs to be

"permanent",

it also contends that they were discharges within the meaning of
Article II Section

2(c).

Let me first deal with the latter contention.

The

-3grievant(s) were not discharged but were laid off.

Under the

terms of the contract they had specific recall rights subsequent
to the layoff and continue to have recall rights generally within the Industry.

Accordingly Article II Section 2(c) is not

applicable to the facts in this case and the Union's reliance
thereon is misplaced.
Each grievant, with the exception of Hansbury was an
operator of some type of mobile vehicle or crane which was being
used in the construction of a large nuclear power plant in
Limerick, Pennsylvania (Hansbury was an oiler on the vehicle
operated by Maberry).

Maberry and Hansbury were assigned to a

seventy ton P and H truck crane and worked moving steel with a
crew of iron workers.

Polito was the operator of a cherry-

picker and worked with pipefitters in moving pipe.

His general

assignment included the handling of various construction material such as lumber, iron, concrete, dirt, "men in cages", as
well as pipe.
Zarnowski was the operator of a seventy-five ton P and
H crane and worked in the layout area of the project with a
crew of pipefitters.
Garlick operated an eighty-two ton link belt crane, and
also worked with the crew of pipefitters in the layout area.
The Union's case is: 1. that Maberry and Hansbury were
laid off and their crane deactivated before they completed the
work assignment with the iron workers and that immediately after
receiving notice of the layoff their crane was replaced in the

-4exact same location by another seventy ton crane operated by a
different operator and different oiler, and that it used the
rigging previously used by Maberry and Hansbury and continued
the same job assignment with the same crew of iron workers; 2:
that when Polito was laid off and his cherrypicker deactivated,
another cherrypicker operated by a different operator replaced
him at the same location and continued his assignment with the
same crew of pipefitters; 3: that when Zarnowski was laid off
and his seventy-five tone P and H crane deactivated he was replaced by an eighty-two ton link belt crane which took his place
and continued the work that he had been performing with the
crew of pipefitters; 4: that when Garlick was laid off and his
eighty-two ton link belt crane deactivated he was replaced by a
one hundred and forty ton P and H crane which cortLnued the same
work which he had been performing in the layout area with the
same crew of pipefitters.
Additionally Polito, a Group I employee contends that
when he was laid off the operator of a remaining cherrypicker
was a Group I-A employee and that to retain a Group I-A employee
in preference to a Group I employee is violative of Article II
Section 2(k) of the contract, and hence a breach of the "just
cause" provision of Article IV Section 4.
It is also the Union's case, and the contention of all
of the grievants that their layoffs were politically inspired
because of their opposition to a particular Union District Agent
in an upcoming Union election, and that such political retaliation is also contrary to the "just cause" language of Article

-5IV Section 4 of the contract.
Finally, with regard to the Zarnowski grievance, it is
contended that Zarnowski's crane was in better mechanical and
operating condition than the cranes which were retained, and to
select his crane is evidence of the political nature of Zarnowski's
displacement; and with regard to the Garlick grievance it is
asserted that his machine was restored to operation two months
after his layoff with another operating crew, and that this is
evidence of the political nature and illegitimacy of his layoff.
The Company denies that any of the layoffs were politically motivated, or that it had any specific knowledge of who
the grievants were supporting in the Union election, or that
Union politics influenced its decisions.

Rather, the Company

asserts that the layoffs were due solely to a reduction in the
available work for those pieces of equipment and that the layoffs were in accordance

with the provisions of the contract

based on a general diminution in construction activity at the
project.

The Company asserts that the determinations to de-

activate the pieces of equipment involved were strictly
managerial decisions in accordance with

managerial authority;

that the contract does not prescribe that layoffs follow
seniority; that in the case of Polito the contract allows layoffs of employees in Groups I and i-A equally and interchangeably; that Zarnowski's crane was not in better mechanical or
operating condition than the two other cranes which remained,
but that in any event there is no contract provision requiring

-6the continuance of the equipment that is mechanically better;
that the reactivation of Garlick's machine with a different
operator is irrelevant in that the contract guarantees the right
of recall for only one week after layoff, (and thereafter recall
is discretionary with the Company); and finally that where
relevant, the decisions were also based on the Company's determination that the remaining cranes, because of specific mechanical characteristics could better perform certain remaining
assignments.
The heart of this case rests with the interpretation of
Article IV Se tion 4 of the contract and particularly the meaning of the "job" referred to therein.

That Section mandates the

continuation of active work "until the end of (the) job"
and until "the conclusion of (the) job, except for just cause."
The parties sharply differ over what constitutes a "job" within
the meaning of that Section.
During the course of the hearing the parties did agree
that "the job" did not mean the completion of the nuclear power
plant.

For if that was to be the interpretation it would mean

that all of the cranes and other equipment involved would have
to be maintained on the property and their crews on the payroll
long after there was any need for them.

However the Union does

contend that the "job" is the particular assignment on which the
equipment is working at the time of the layoff.

Based on that

interpretation the Union points to the fact that the specific
assignments on which the grievants were working, (i.e. moving

-7material with the iron workers or the pipefitters or in the layout area) had not been finished and that other equipment replaced
the laid off grievants and continued the very same work.
The Company argues that Article IV Section 4 is not intended to define "the job" but rather, because it is entitled
"Weekly Pay" is nothing more than a contract provision which
guarantees a forty hour work week if employees work for more
than five days.

However the Company offered testimony of an

official of the Contractors' Association who negotiated this
contract on behalf of the various employer signatories.

He

stated that Article IV Section 4 does define "the job" and that
the industry-wide

interpretation

of a "job" for equipment oper-

ators is "so long as the employer decides to use that particular
piece of equipment."

Or in other words so long as a particular

crane or cherrypicker is in operation the operator (and oiler)
on that equipment may not be replaced on that piece of equipment
by another operator

(and oiler), but that if an employer decides

to discontinue any such piece of equipment his decision to do
so brings an end

or conclusion to "the job" of that vehicle

within the meaning of Article IV Section 4.

Additionally, based

on its case, it is the Company's position that the job for any
particular piece of equipment ends when any such equipment is
deactivated and its crew laid off because of a diminution in
work that is available for all equipment performing work to which
any or all of them may be assigned.
The pertinent language of Article IV Section 4 together

-8with the foregoing various interpretations compels the conclusion
that the meaning of a "job" is undefined, unclear, and hence
ambiguous.

As such, the ambiguity must be clarified by tradi-

tional and well accepted methods in such cases, namely intent
gleaned from negotiations and evidence of practice in implementation of that intent.
The practice in the Industry represents good evidence of
what was intended when Article IV Section 4 was negotiated by
the Union and the various employer signatories to the contract
represented by the Contractors' Association.

The Union offered

no testimony or evidence of what transpired during negotiations
in order to establish the meaning and intent of the critical
language of Article IV Section 4.

However the negotiator for

the Contractors' Association testified without refutation that
an employee's job ended within the meaning of Article IV Section
4 when the employer decided to discontinue the use of the equipment on which he worked.

He testified that that has been the

practice in the Industry in implementation of Article IV Section
4.

I accept that interpretation

subject to the further clari-

fication below.
The "replacements" about which the Union complain in
this proceeding I find were not replacements within the proscription of Article IV Section 4, but rather reassignments of
work because of a drop in the quantity of work at the job site
in general, together with a drop in the overall manpower and a
diminution in the specific work available to be performed by the

-9cranes and other equipment involved in this case.

Less equipment

was required and hence the deactivation of some of that equipment and the layoff of some of its operators followed.

In that

respect what the Company is saying, what the practice has been,
and what I deem to be the most realistic and appropriate definition of "a job" is the overall and total quantity of available
work to which the cranes and other equipment involved in this
case are or could be jurisdictionally assigned.

When that total

available work diminishes, so that for example only two cranes
rather than three are necessary to meet the Company's needs, the
"job" for one of the cranes has ended, and it may be deactivated
and its operator (and oiler) laid off.

That the remaining crane

or cranes physically take over the very same functions previously
performed by the laid off crane is immaterial.
concededly mobile.

The cranes are

It is conceded that they may be assigned to

different locations and different work on a daily basis.

In

other words they may be shifted around to cover the available
work.

If the available work diminishes and one crane is de-

activated as a result, it is not improper nor surprising that
the remaining crane or cranes would at some point, and possibly
immediately be reassigned to cover the available work including,
if that work enjoyed priority, the very duties previously
handled by the crane and employees laid off.
Based on the substantial evidence submitted by the
Company regarding the diminution in manpower and the drop in
available work for the cranes and the cherrypicker in the instant

-10situation, I am persuaded that the layoffs of the vehicles
operated and worked on by the grievants, and the layoffs of the
grievants followed the foregoing formula and were due to those
circumstances.

I appreciate the fact that in each instance it

may have looked to the grievants as a proscribed "replacement"
before their job was completed.

But considering the definition

of a job. based on contract negotiations and industry-wide
practice, what the grievants saw was not a "replacement" within
the meaning of Article IV Section 4 of the contract but rather
a reassignment of remaining vehicles within the same job, but to
a new function within that job, and only to cover the diminished
available work.
If the Union's interpretation of a "job" was accepted it
would mean that the Company had to retain the services of all its
cranes and other equipment so long as something remained to be
done on the particular function assigned to that equipment on any
particular day.

That would mean that even if a full days work

was not available for each piece of equipment, all that equipment
nonetheless had to be fully maintained on the portions of work
which remained.

In the absence of evidence of that intent at

the time the contract was negotiated and in the absence of any
practice supportive of that interpretation, I am unable to
conclude that Article IV Section 4 intended that inefficient and
uneconomic result.

In the instant case the grievants and their

equipment could have been retained instead of some other comparable equipment, and if in that case the grievants had been reassigned the next day to some work functions previously performed

-11by a vehicle and crew laid off, it would not be the grievants
in this case who would complain but rather the employees of the
other laid off vehicle.

That possibility demonstrates that the

definition of the "job" is the totality of available work to
which any of the cranes or other relevant equipment may be
jurisdictionally

assigned.

With regard to the question of layoffs and seniority, the
Company is contractually correct despite the priorities which
unions generally accord employees with greater seniority.

In

this contract there is no such restriction in layoff situations.
The employer is not barred from laying off senior employees and
retaining junior employees.

The only relevant restriction is

that he first layoff employees in Group III, then employees in
Group II, "before laying off employees in Group I or I-A"
(emphasis added).

The Company has complied with this restriction

In the case of Polito the Union and the grievant are in error
when they contend that a Group I-A employee must be laid off
before an employee in Group I.

The contract places employees

in Group I and I-A together for purposes of layoff and the
Company may layoff in either group interchangeably without
according either seniority or priority to one over the other.
Therefore that the Company retained an employee classified in
Group I-A as the operator of a cherrypicker when it laid off
Polito who enjoyed Group I status was not in and of itself a
contract violation.

I find it unnecessary to determine whether

in fact the remaining cherrypicker operator was a Group I or
Group I-A employee because the Union does not allege a breach of

-12Section 2(k) of Article II of the contract.
Based on the evidence in the record I am unable to conclude that the grievants were selected for layoff because of a
policy of political retaliation or because of their political
opposition to an incumbent Union leader.

There may very well

be an intense internal union dispute over the union election,
and within the union the grievants may be subject to some
adverse reaction to their political disposition.

However, in

order to establish that their layoffs were due to political
considerations, the grievants must make a connection between the
internal Union dispute and the actions of the Company.
connection has not been made.

That

No place in this record has the

Union or the grievants been able to impute to the Company or to
the Company representatives who made the layoff decisions either
knowledge of the grievants political views, their support of one
candidate over another, or any political influence in the Company's
decision as to which employees and which equipment was to be
laid off.

The fact is that even if political considerations

entered into the decision, the arbitration forum would not be the
place to seek redress if the Company's decisions were nonetheless consistent with the contract.

Here, under the contract,

because the Company may effectuate layoffs irrespective of seniority, it may select whichever employees and whichever equipment it wishes.

If the laid off employees happen to be in

political opposition to an incumbent Union leader, it would be
a matter for consideration of the Labor Board, the courts or
some other forum.

But it is not for arbitration, where the

-13arbitrator's authority is confined to the interpretation and
application of the contract.
Finally, the Company is correct when it asserts there
is no contract provision covering the mechanical quality of
equipment to be retained or laid off, and no contract obligatior
to recall an employee to the piece of equipment on which he
previously served after the expiration of one week following his
layoff.

Therefore it is immaterial whether Zarnowski's crane

was in better shape than those that were retained and there is
no violation of the contract nor may any adverse inferences be
drawn from the Company's failure to recall Garlick to his
machine some two months following his layoff.
In sum, though I appreciate how intensely the grievants
feel about what they consider to be improper layoffs, I must
conclude that the evidence shows a substantial reduction in
available work for the vehicles which the grievants operated
and therefore a justifiable basis for a reduction in the numbers
of those vehicles based on the inherent managerial right to reduce
the work force when the available work has dropped and the right
to retain equipment the Company deems better suited to the remaining work.

Political considerations in the selection of the

grievants for layoff have not been proved for reasons indicated.
However in that regard the rights of the grievants, if any, for
any action in any other appropriate forum are expressly reserved,
inasmuch as I have ruled that this
place to raise that challenge.

arbitration forum is not the

In the absence of any relevent

contract restriction on the Company's right to decide which

-14employees are to be laid off and which are to be retained, the
fact that the grievants may have been senior to those who continued at work does not constitute a violation of this particular
collective bargaining agreement.
For these and the other reasons referred to herein, the
grievances must be denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
1. The layoffs of Robert J. Hansbury and
Thomas Maberry, Jr. were not in violation
of Article IV Section 4 or Article II
Section 2(c) of the collective bargaining
agreement.
2. The layoff of Joseph Polito was not in
violation of Article IV Section 4 or Article
II Section 2(c) of the collective bargaining
agreement.
3. The layoff of Ralph ^arnowski was not in
violation of Article IV Section 4 or Article
II Section 2(c) of the collective bargaining
agreement.
4. The layoff of William J. Garlick was not
in violation of Article IV Section 4 or
Article II Section 2(c) of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 6, 1977

